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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates how social capital can lead to enhanced economic development 
through lowering transaction costs and promoting labour productivity and investment. The 
research question is: How does social capital influence economic development in Latin 
America? 
 
Based on a combination of classical economic theory and social capital theory, three 
hypotheses concerning the causality between social capital and economic development are 
made. These suggest that social capital enhance economic development through the lowering 
of transaction costs (H1), promotion of productivity (H2) and promotion of investment (H3). 
By investigating these mechanisms, this thesis counters the frequently expressed critique of 
social capital theory, namely the lack of understanding of this causality. Furthermore, it 
expands the scope of the social capital theory in a developing context viz. a Latin American 
one.  
 
The existence of a general relationship between social capital, measured as trust, and 
economic development, measured as growth in GDP, is determined by a regression analysis 
of 19 Latin American countries. The analysis also reveals Uruguay as the country with the 
highest value on the variable of interest, social capital. I thus select Uruguay as the case of 
investigation. The transfer mechanisms are investigated by process-tracing in an in-depth 
study based on interview data from Uruguayan businesses, where transactions, investment and 
productivity are crucial activities.  
 
 The results indicate that trust does have an economic pay-off through the lowering of 
transaction costs (H1). The effect of trust on labour productivity (H2) is also supported, but 
seems to be influenced by factors important in a development context, such as socioeconomic 
security and crime, apparently omitted in social capital theory. The effect of trust on 
economic development through investment (H3) is not supported by the data. The answer to 
the research question is therefore that in the Latin American case of Uruguay social capital 
influences economic development through lowering of transaction costs and through 
promotion of labour productivity.  
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 1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
"Crear confianza es fundamental para reactivar el mercado interno, aumentar las 
exportaciones y crear el trabajo"1 (Fernando De la Rúa, 2001) 
 
This statement was articulated by the Argentinean president Fernando De La Rua during the 
economic breakdown in 2001 (Diario del pueblo 2001). He was stating the fundamental 
importance of trust for maintaining investment rates and production. This thesis investigates 
the relationship indicated by De la Rúa:  
 
How does social capital influence economic development in Latin America? 
 
Although much research has been conducted into the consequences and sources of social 
capital, I argue that the research question in this thesis represents a contribution to the 
literature. First, in De la Rua´s own region, Latin America, the economic consequences of 
social capital have scarcely been investigated. Secondly, criticism of the extensive work on 
the link between social capital and economic development is directed to the lack of focus on 
exactly how this relationship holds.  
1.1 The importance of investigating this relationship 
 
The overall answer to why one should investigate the impact of social capital on economic 
development is that on a continent where the poverty rate in many countries exceeds 50 
percent, getting a better understanding of the sources of economic development is always 
important. This is highlighted by the frustrated comment of one of my interview subjects, 
Isidoro Hodara, the leader of Uruguay’s largest free trade zone: “Economic development and 
Latin America are contradictory concepts” (Hodara 2009). The argument for investigating the 
particular economic contribution of social capital and its relationship with the economy is 
two-fold.  
 
First, my research question is highly relevant because by understanding the implication of 
trust on economic output, measures of economic improvement can be developed. In order to 
                                                 
1
 “Creating trust is fundamental for reactivating the internal market, increasing export and developing 
employment”.  
 2 
develop new policies and measures of improvement, knowledge is necessary. When mapping 
out how trust affects for example productivity, it will hence be easier to reform and improve 
the routines and policies concerning this mechanism, both on an institutional macro level and 
a business meso level. Further, by analogy, before you build a house you need to construct the 
foundation wall: All sources of economic development, that being trade, productivity, 
innovation or investment, rest on the micro platform within a society, the individuals, and 
their relation to these sources. Thus, an understanding of the influence of social capital on the 
economy, lays the foundation for a fuller understanding of other crucial development factors.  
 
Secondly, I argue that my research question contributes to the existing literature by improving 
the ability to construct verified scientific explanations for the abovementioned aspects in 
Latin America (King et al. 1994: 15). It does so in several ways.   
 
First, my thesis contributes to the theory of social capital by emphasizing the investigation of 
transfer mechanisms. Torsvik (2004: 257) stresses that in order for social capital to explain 
economic success, the interaction of the variables and the mechanisms behind the interaction 
must be specified. He claims that the theory of social capital falls short in this respect. This 
thesis contributes to a further understanding of this interaction by emphasizing the elaboration 
of the causal mechanisms between social capital and its economic outcomes. In order to do 
this, I first determine whether a general relationship between social capital and economic 
development actually exists in Latin America. 
 
In section 3.2 I thus carry out a multiple regression analysis on 19 Latin American countries 
and find that social capital, here treated as a national characteristic and operationalized as the 
aggregate level of trust in each country, has a significant explanatory power on economic 
development, other variables kept constant. The regression analysis also functions as a case-
selecting tool, since units with high or low values on the pertinent variables are good for 
generating theoretical and empirical insights (Lieberman 2005: 435). The case with the 
highest value on the variable of particular interest, social capital, is Uruguay. This means that 
Uruguay should be a particularly good case for looking into how social capital functions. 
Further, in order to specify the causalities, I formulate three hypotheses which are investigated 
by conducting within-case process tracing of the transfer mechanisms between trust and 
economic development based on interview data from Uruguay. By transfer mechanisms in 
this thesis, I refer to the influence of trust on the economy through its impact on transaction 
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costs (H1), production (H2) and investment (H3) – all of them fundamental elements in doing 
business.  
 
Secondly, this study contributes to the theory of outcomes of social capital by conducting a 
quantitative and qualitative analysis in a geographic area scarcely investigated by social 
capital theorists. Putnam’s original work on social capital studied the impact of social capital 
on regional development in Italy (Putnam 1993). In “Bowling Alone” he put emphasis on the 
decline of social capital in the USA (Putnam 1995). Rothstein, among others, has done 
extensive work on Europe and the Scandinavian countries (Rothstein 2003; Knudsen and 
Rothstein 1994; Kumlin and Rothstein 2005; Beugelsdijk 2005).  India, Nepal, Ethiopia and 
Tanzania have been objects of case-studies on social capital (Ostrom 2000; Krishna 2004; 
Narayan 1999; Gabre-Madhin 2001), while numerous empirical studies have been conducted 
based on data from the whole world investigating the economic output of social capital 
(Knack and Keefer 1997; Zak and Knack 2001; Bjørnskov 2006a). Although De la Rua is not 
the only one emphasizing the importance of trust, few studies have had the main focus on 
Latin America when investigating social capital and its consequences, and I find no published 
work on mechanisms of social capital in Uruguay
2
.   
 
Thirdly, my study plays a part in modifying theories on the sources of social capital. The 
theory on sources of social capital is roughly divided in two. On the one hand, Putnam 
(Putnam 1993, 1995) claim that social capital stems from networks and organizations in 
society, while Rothstein et al (Rothstein 2003; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2005) 
consider institutional macro structures to be most important for the creation of social capital 
When using process tracing on the causal mechanisms, I investigate the causal relationships 
from the beginning to the end in order to make the identification of the process more robust 
(Bennett and Elman 2006). I therefore go back to the sources of social capital. My empirical 
investigation shows that both institutional macro factors and meso networks are important and 
even closely connected. This thesis thus modifies the dichotomy between the meso and macro 
level.  
 
                                                 
2
 Some work on social capital in Latin America has been done, viz. e.g. Booth and Richards (1998), Neace 
(2004), Klesner (2007). 
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Last, but not least, strengthening the hypothesis of the positive effect of social capital on the 
economy is meant to contribute to strengthening the understanding of economic development 
theory as well. Such a contribution is in itself valuable, because knowledge about 
development can even out economic disequilibrium. “Enhancing social capital is part of the 
key to successful development transformations” (Stiglitz 1998: 43). 
1.2 Expectations  
My expectance of trust enhancing economic development rests on the classical economic 
theory on economic development which defines investment and labour productivity as crucial 
for economic growth (Romer 1996: Ch. 1; Barro 1997). Given the increase in growth caused 
by increasing investment and productivity, this thesis focuses on how trust promotes those 
two economic engines.  
 
The first theoretical expectation is that trust lowers the costs of transactions, which is positive 
for investment. Using time on assuring credibility towards a transaction partner requires 
resources that trust contributes to diminish (Bjørnskov 2006a). Trusty networks also make it 
easier to find a transaction partner, and lastly, high levels of trust enable informal transactions 
to a higher degree.  
 
The second expectation is that trust promotes productivity. If a worker invests time in 
working harder, it is because he trusts in the pay-off of this action. In order to increase 
productivity you hence need a trust-relationship between the employer and the employee 
(Knack and Keefer 1997).  
 
Lastly, hypothesis three expresses the expectation of trust enhancing investment. When 
allocating economic resources, both depositors and lenders are exposed to risks, which are 
minimized by trust (Calderon et al. 2002). High social trust makes a society more stable and 
predicable, which gives better incentives for investment (Bjørnskov 2003: 6-7).  
 
Humphrey (Humphrey 1998: 43) stresses that sanctions and trust are additive. This implies, in 
theoretical terms, that states with good sanction possibilities, such as well-functioning 
institutions, need less trust for diminishing risk. Given that developing countries, such as 
many countries in Latin America, have less developed institutions, the role of trust can 
become even more important in transacting, producing and investing.  
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Figure 1 shows that a micro level concept such as trust can promote economic development 
through business. Furthermore, sources on both meso and macro level are important for social 
capital.  
 
Figure 1.1 The argument 
 
LEVEL      ARGUMENT           SOURCES  
        ECONOMIC    INSTITUTIONS, 
MACRO          DEVELOPMENT       POLICY 
 
 
             
                        
MESO                                                                                                            NETWORKS,      
                                                                                                                ORGANIZATIONS       
 
 
      
 
MICRO           SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 2 starts with elaborating on a definition of the term social capital. As the term is 
widely used and treated, it has numerous different definitions. In this thesis I emphasize 
previous work when constructing a definition. I argue that interpersonal trust is the core 
element in all the reviewed definitions. It is also parsimonious and widely used as an 
operationalized definition in empirical studies. Trust is treated as a national characteristic in 
the quantitative analysis, while as an individual property in the qualitative analysis. A brief 
discussion of the sources of social capital is also necessary due to its relevance in the tracing 
of processes between trust and economic output – the process shall be traced from its 
beginning to its end. Finally, theoretically, I place social capital within the economic 
discipline and elaborate on the transfer mechanisms between social capital and economic 
 
BUSINESS 
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development. Based on the theoretically expected causalities, I shall formulate four 
hypotheses. One general hypothesis is examined in the regression analysis: Social capital has 
a positive effect on economic development in Latin America. Three main hypotheses about 
the mechanisms of this relationship are investigated in the qualitative analysis: H1 Trust 
lowers transaction costs, H2 Trust has a positive effect on productivity, and H3 Trust 
increases investment. 
 
In Chapter 3 I justify my use of a multiple regression analysis and why I follow up with a 
case-study and process-tracing to investigate the three main hypotheses. The case selection, 
which is not a random one, is also justified, before measurement and operationalization of the 
variables are treated, both for use in the quantitative and qualitative analysis. Trust is the 
measure of social capital in both the regression analysis and in the process tracing, although 
the scope of trust is somewhat expanded in the qualitative approach; the sources of trust are 
also taken into consideration in order to trace the whole process. Economic development is 
measured as growth in GDP per capita in the regression analysis, while economic gains at the 
business level are the dependent variable in the process-tracing. In the analysis in chapters 4 
and 5, I maintain the same order: The quantitative regression analysis is presented first, 
followed by the process tracing analysis of the three theoretically elaborated hypotheses, 
based on first-hand interview data from Uruguay and on relevant secondary literature.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 7 
2 THEORY 
 
This chapter will theoretically explore the possible effect of social capital on economic 
development. First, I discuss why I use trust as the definition of social capital throughout the 
thesis and what trust is. Secondly, I treat the sources of social capital, relevant for the 
qualitative analysis. Thirdly, I focus on how social capital can be placed within the economic 
discipline, and lastly, I focus on the mechanisms that link social capital and economic 
development. The main purpose of the theory chapter is to develop hypotheses explaining the 
transfer mechanisms between social capital and economic development. I will construct one 
general hypothesis to be analysed quantitatively and three specific hypotheses to be 
investigated in the qualitative analysis.   
2.1 Social capital is trust 
Social capital is a widely treated concept with many definitions, including both inclusive and 
parsimonious ones. In order to define social capital in this thesis I have investigated previous 
work on social capital, and found trust to be an indicator or definition of the concept in all of 
them (table 1). In addition to trust, Putnam refers to social capital as the social networks and 
norms that allow citizens to act together more successfully to pursue shared goals (Putnam 
1995: 1, 2000). His definition is used in a large amount of work on social capital. Bourdieu 
(1985: 248) defines social capital as the resources which are linked to the possession of 
networks or relationships, while Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 226) write that “…the basic 
idea of social capital is that a person's family, friends, and associates constitute an important 
asset”.  
 
I agree with Putnam, Bourdieu, Woolcock and Narayan that networks, organizations and 
society have a great impact on social capital and that close ties to family and friends have 
positive outcomes. However, I stress a division between the cause, the effect and the content 
in the social capital concept. There should be a clear separation between the definition of the 
concept, theoretically and empirically, and its alleged effects (Portes 1998: 21). Otherwise, 
one may risk using tautological definitions. Social networks and organizations create trust 
among the individuals or groups involved which make citizen act together more successfully. 
Family, friends and associates constitute an important asset in this respect because they create 
trust and confidence in the surroundings. These networks, organizations and social ties are 
thus the sources of social capital, and the outcome is trust. Further, “acting together more 
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successfully” are the consequences of social capital, as well as the possible economic gains 
investigated in this thesis. I aspire to use a definition of social capital which does neither 
include the causes nor the effects, but rather the content. By distinguishing between sources of 
trust and trust itself, I avoid the “confusion of causes and effects” made by Putnam (Sobel 
2002: 140). I also respond to the main critique of social capital, namely vagueness (Torsvik 
2004), by explicitly stating a precise and parsimonious definition.  
 
I measure trust in the quantitative analysis by answers to the survey question: “In general, do 
you trust other people?” Trust is conceptualized as a national characteristic in the quantitative 
analysis, while it is an individual property in the qualitative analysis.  Lastly, trust is a concept 
that exists in all societies, applicable in different part of the world, including in a Latin 
American context. For all of my Uruguayan respondents, trust was a familiar and 
comprehensible word. When former president De la Rua encouraged the Argentinean people 
to trust the politicians in times of crises, he wished to increase the stock of social capital in 
Argentina in what I thus consider to be the core of the concept.  
 
Table 1 shows the trust indicator to be a core element across a wide range of studies done on 
social capital in relation to economic output.  
Table 2.1 Measurement in the development-related social capital theory 
Author    Trust  Networks    Collectiveness  Other 
Coleman 1988   +  +    + 
Putnam 1993, 2000   +  +  + 
Evans 1996    +  +   
La Porta 1997    +   
Knack and Keefer 1997  + 
Zaheer, McEvily, Perrone 1998 +   
Temple 1998    +      + 
Nayaran 1999    +  +  +    
Collier and Gunning 1999  +  +  +   
Zak and Knack 2001   +    
Woolcock 2001   +  +    
Clegg et al. 2002   + 
Glaeser et al. 2002   +  +    + 
Knak Zak 2003   +   
Beugelsdijk 2004   +   
Neace 2004    +  +  
Krishna 2004    +  +  +  +   
Francois et al. 2004   +      +  
Bengtsson, Berggren, Jordahl 2005 +  
Rothstein 2001, 2005   +  + 
Bjørnskov 2006   +  
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2.1.1 What is trust in this thesis? 
In this thesis trust is considered to be the core element of social capital. However, there are 
diverging understandings of what trust is in different disciplines. In economics, trust tends to 
be viewed as calculative and rational or institutional (North 1990). In psychology, trust is 
more framed by the personal cognitive experience of the individual, while in sociology and 
political science trust is considered to be a risk-reducing feature, socially embedded in society 
or created by policy and institutions (Rousseau 1998). Across these disciplines, there are also 
divergent views on the definitions of trust: Multilevel trust, which is trust on different levels, 
e.g. individual, institutional, or within group and organizational trust, which focuses on the 
group based trust between organizations.  
 
However, across disciplines, there is an agreement on the core conditions of trust: Risk and 
interdependence (Rousseau 1998: 394-395). Risk is the perceived probability of loss, as 
interpreted by a decision maker (Chiles and McMackin 1996). Trust is not needed when 
something is absolutely certain. If you trade with another person, there will always be a 
certain element of risk involved, unless you have a hundred percent formalized contract. 
However, almost all trades imply some risk, and trust is consequently nearly always needed.   
 
Interdependence refers to the fact that the interest of one person cannot be achieved without 
reliance upon the other person. These two core components of trust constitute the basis for the 
understanding of trust used in this thesis. As this thesis has an interdisciplinary dimension 
comprising common aspects of political science, sociology and economy, my understanding 
and definition of the term trust mirror this interdisciplinary character.  
 
Nannestad (2008: 416-417), along with Torsvik (2004), points at a gap between the 
theoretical meaning of trust and the empirical studies conducted. This is solved by stating the 
explicit meaning of it. In order to deal with the critique of lack of construct validity, I have 
briefly elaborated on what trust implies in this work. In the first place, it is seen as belonging 
to the individual, which can be aggregated to constitute a societal characteristic. In any case, it 
is an aggregate societal good. This is analysed first at a macro level where the good is growth 
in GDP, then at a meso level, where the good is economic performance and gains for 
Uruguayan businesses. Secondly, it is built on the assumptions of risk and interdependence, 
which form a solid foundation for moving between economy and political science. As such, 
 10 
my approach to the term trust is adapted to the context of this study, viz. an empirical 
quantitative and qualitative one (Bigley 1998: 415; Krishna 2004)
3
.  
2.1.2 Does trust vary? 
I argue that trust varies. If not, it would not have been fruitful to conduct this research, as no 
measures could have been done in order to increase the level of trust and consequently the 
level of economic development. However, it is a slowly changing feature. This is a relevant 
consideration when I aim to investigate if trust affects economic output in Latin America.  
 
Whether trust is path dependent, a product of interaction in society or created by institutional 
factors is disputed. The answers to this question can, again, be grouped into two groups. 1. All 
forms of exchange are embedded in comparatively fixed social relationships (Putnam 1993; 
Granovetter 1985). 2. Trust is dependent on policy and institutions. It is not a given form, but 
a result of political practices, which shapes the possibility of economic advancement 
(Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2005; Coleman 1988; Paldam 2000; Weber 1978). 
 
 Granovetter (1985) stresses that trust is path dependent, which implies the indifference to 
government action and intervention (Fukuyama 1996). Putnam also stresses that the trust in 
the Italian regions was established a long time ago, and is not easy to change through policy. 
However, he stressed a decline in social capital in the US (Putnam 1995) Further, according to 
Lagos (2001: 143) “[t]he low levels of trust in Latin America derive from deeply rooted 
historical, social, and institutional factors”.  
 
According to the more liberal social capital theorists this not the case; they regard state-
society relations as potentially fruitful for trust. The state can “nurture a stable, progressive 
and predictable environment in which a vibrant civil society can emerge” (Woolcock 1998: 
157). Similarly, the welfare state is considered as a good promoter of trust.  It is the best 
environment for trust to surge, according to Rothstein (2005), who argues empirically that the 
Scandinavian countries hold the highest level of trust. Does his point of view indicate that we 
should not expect a high level of trust in Latin America? On the one hand, yes, due to the 
limited welfare state in many countries. On the other hand, no, since a strong welfare state 
could crowd out the trust, as it is no longer needed when the state is a complete supplier of 
                                                 
3
 Coleman and Bourdieu are not considered when treating the nature of trust in this thesis. Although they hold 
trust as the key element of social capital, they see trust as an individual advantage (Bourdieu 1983, 1984, 1991; 
Coleman 1988), while I focus on the societal output of trust. 
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necessities (Van Oorschot 2005). This view constitutes an optimistic approach on the level of 
social capital in Latin America. Strong family ties and voluntary engagement are in place, as 
the state does not contribute total social security. As Coleman states, it is the closest ties that 
create the primordial social organization (Coleman 1991).  
 
The explanation of both trust generated by policy and institutions, and from networks and 
community activity, implies slow changes. Even tough policy-related trust is more exposed to 
governmental changes; it will develop slowly, and not change radically from one year to the 
next. As Bjørnskov (2006a: 10) states: “[…P]anel estimates are infeasible as the variation 
over time used to identify effects is likely to be almost random in most countries”. I thus treat 
trust as a varying concept, though slow-moving.  
2.2 Sources of trust  
Philosophers like Immanuel Kant and David Hume highlighted the importance of trust and 
grappled with a definition of the term (Hume 1888; 2006a: 10; Kant 2007 [1909]). But in 
order to create a definition, it was necessary to know where trust came from. There has not 
been, and there is not, an agreement of the sources of trust.   
 
In the literature I find a dichotomy regarding the creation of trust. One approach focuses on a 
community level while the other is on a society wide level. The communitarian approach 
emphasizes organizational and local activity as the creator of trust, and the effect that this 
trust has on the local community (Putnam 1993). The macro level approach on the other hand 
focuses on the creation of trust at an aggregate level, embedded in the institutions and 
performance of a country (Rothstein and Stolle 2008). Both approaches have focused their 
empirical work on developed countries such as the US, Italy and the Scandinavian countries, 
while I will apply the theory to the Latin American countries. I find that both approaches are 
relevant in the case-study of Uruguay, and will therefore briefly present them.    
2.2.1 Trust stems from networks 
It all comes down to who you know, is a common understanding of personal outcomes, even 
though it may seem unfair. You may be intelligent and hardworking, but if you do not have 
the right friends or if you lack a social network, it is unlikely that you will go far. The network 
is already established at school, when cooperation is a part of the learning process and 
evaluated positively (Woolcock 1998: 158). The social gathering factor continues with 
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football teams, voluntary community work, or other leisure time activities, where the social 
factor may not be the primary goal, but it is definitely the means (Putnam 1993). The 
emphasis on trust rests, on the one hand, on the importance of these day-to-day habits and 
activities in the development of a community. In Latin America these activities correspond to 
the activities stated by Putnam, but in addition, many Latin American countries have such 
experiences as active Catholic groups, frequent family celebrations etc.  
 
Putnam’s - in some ways pioneering – work, reveals variation in those given social factors 
which co-vary with important developmental outputs (Putnam 1993). The features of social 
life, networks and trust enable participants to act together more effectively (Loury 1992: 100; 
Putnam 1995: 664-665). Thus, the trust of a community is first and foremost based on 
network activity. According to Wollebæk and Selle it is not so relevant whether individuals 
are active or passive in the network, but that they are affiliated (Wollebaek and Selle 2002: 
32). All connections within a network can constitute a source of trust – whether active or not 
(Wollebaek and Selle 2002). 
2.2.2 Trust stems from institutions  
Rothstein disagrees with Putnam on this point. Rothstein maintains that political and legal 
institutions channel and create trust (Hall 1999; Rothstein 2005; Bretzer 2005). Networks can 
consist of untrustworthy agents, which play a destructive role in society
4
. For example, 
networks can be held together by distrusting agents who are outside the network. There is thus 
no logical reason why membership in networks per se should be a desired social value 
(Rothstein and Stolle 2008: 3). Furthermore, a network can nurture a high level of trust inside 
the network, but exclude people outside this group, which actually decreases the generalized 
trust or trust in people that you do not know.  
 
An example is the jewellery market in Buenos Aires, which is mainly Jewish with a high 
degree of intermarriage. It is a rather closed community where everybody knows everybody. 
They share the same religion, language and culture. This is fruitful for the commercial interest 
of each individual, as it promotes trust and the security necessary to facilitate transactions in 
the market within the community (Coleman 1988). Following Rothstein’s logic, however, this 
is not necessarily fruitful for society because it remains inside a closed group, although it does 
provide something to the individuals inside the group.   
                                                 
4
 Guerrillas, terror groups or military organizations can also hold a high stock of social capital. 
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2.3 Economic development  
2.3.1 Why investigate sources of economic development? 
The dependent variable of the thesis is economic development. The main objective of my 
work, along with so many others before it, is to investigate the reasons for the variation in 
levels of economic development.  
 
Although seen as the most important question in economics (Barro 1997), and treated as an 
obvious good for every citizen, development is not an undisputed benefit. The effect of 
growth in GDP on happiness and well-being has been questioned. Investigations based on 
cross-sectional data, including both developing countries and developed countries, have 
questioned whether the subjective feeling of happiness follows the level of development 
(Easterlin 2005). It is not given that sources that contribute to positive change in the economic 
situation have a constant relationship with improved subjective life quality. There are also 
many cases of countries where there is a positive growth rate, while the distribution of the 
economic resources in the population is poor. In these cases the outcome of economic 
development ends up in the hands of a small minority of people and cannot be said to have a 
decidedly positive effect on the macro level. Finally, the latest environment report from the 
UN, points at countries with a high economic level of development as consuming cultures that 
have brought the world into a climate crisis. Sources of economic development sustainable for 
the climate are urgently needed (UN 2009). 
 
However, development is semantically a positively loaded word, indicating that an object 
moves from one state towards a better or greater one. The economic situation for a country is 
heading in the right direction if it is developing. Inglehart (2008) and Hagerty (2003) argue 
that this occurs both on macro and micro levels. Cross-sectional comparisons of nations show 
that variation in the happiness of their people and economic development are strongly 
correlated. The extent to which a society has freedom of choice has an impact on well-being 
and happiness. The freedom of choice in turn, is increased by economic development 
(Inglehart 2008: 264-266). 
 
Furthermore, economic development contributes to better institutions and legal systems, a 
higher employment rate, and improved infrastructure (Berkowitz 2003; Démurger 2001). 
Development and improvement in material goods lay the groundwork for the possibility of 
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improving the quality of life. Basic needs for material goods need to be covered before you 
can question the source of your happiness or well-being (Maslow 1976). A higher level of 
gross domestic product (GDP) has positive payoffs on both micro and macro levels (Barro 
1997; Inglehart 2008; Kenny 2005; Lipset 1959). The hope is that a “simple” factor as trust 
could thus indirectly improve quality of life. 
2.3.2 What is economic development? 
 
In this thesis, economic development is measured as growth in GDP per capita in the 
quantitative analysis. In the qualitative analysis economic development refers to the economic 
output and gains of business at the meso level, which is expected to influence the national 
growth in GDP at the macro level. However, these particular measures are not given: 
 
Economic development is a multifaceted concept, which may imply a broad variety of 
measures and operationalizations. Nevertheless, the term economical development boils down 
to constituting a measure of how the level of a unit moves forward, in terms of its economic 
features. As a political economy term it tells us how well off a country is. Basic economic 
developmental goals are sustained growth, equity, and democracy (Portes and Landolt 2000). 
However, the goals and the development level per se should not be mixed. In the 
measurement of economic development, equity and democracy are not necessarily included, 
or even relevant. There are divergent purposes for measuring development and also different 
understandings of the content of this concept. 
 
 In his theory on the causal relationship between economic development and democracy, 
Lipset used the number of telephones in a household to measure development (Lipset 1969). 
In modernization theory then, economic development is reflected through material and 
technological progress. Jackman (1973) estimated the effect of economic development on 
democracy by looking at energy consumption per capita as the economic development 
indicator (Cutright 1963, 1969). A traditional measure of economic development is also 
annual change in GDP, known as the growth rate, which is the basis for my measure.  
 
Krishna (2004) investigated if social capital helped to improve development in the third world 
by studying villages in India. He used a more inclusive definition, and did not only investigate 
the economic development outcomes, but also the developmental changes. In his extensive 
study he used four different measures of development, adjusted to the local conditions of the 
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areas investigated. Livelihood stability is a principal development requirement, as it enables 
the most important industry in the region, namely agriculture. Water availability is also 
covered by this measure. The other three measures of development constituted poverty 
reduction, employment generation and quality of health and education (Krishna 2004). 
Krishna’s measure of development reflects the broad, pragmatic and fundamental meaning of 
the word. It also imparts the fact that development, focusing on only the economic dimension 
or not, should be measured according to the area or purpose of the research project.  
 
The quantitative analysis of my thesis investigates if trust can explain economic development 
at a general level on a whole continent – Latin America. My project is thus distinguished from 
Krishna’s Indian project as regards the area dimension, since he carries out case-studies 
within a small geographic area as the basis for investigation (Krishna 2004). I will therefore 
not be able to adapt my measure of economic development locally to the same extent, which 
is neither desirable nor my purpose. However, in the following qualitative approach, I do 
concentrate my investigation on a small geographic area, and I adjust the measure according 
to the purpose of my research, namely the influence of trust on economic development.  
 
Growth in GDP as a measure of economic development has some disadvantages. It only 
includes formal economic activities, which excludes relevant information, at least in 
developing countries where the informal part of the economic life is highly important. In 
Uruguay this is evident, since the informal economy is estimated to be 37 percent of the total 
economy in 2008 (Brasca et al. 2009). Moreover, it does not reflect the degree of distribution: 
Growth may be high, and also increasing, but the level of GDP, which is the basis of the 
growth estimate, can be highly influenced by outliers – a few inhabitants with a high 
percentage of the total GDP. This is especially relevant for small oil-producing countries 
(Diamond 1992) and also for Latin America; According to the UN development report 2008, 
Bolivia scores 60.1 on a 0-100 GINI scale
5
 which measures inequality, and Colombia, 
Paraguay, Brazil, Panama and Guatemala above 55 on the same scale. Finally, the growth 
level does not estimate the level of human development in a country, such as literacy, life 
expectancy or schooling.  
 
                                                 
5
 GINI is a frequently used measure of income inequality. It derives from the Lorenz curve, which displays the 
cumulative share of total income accruing to successive income intervals (Todaro 2000: 215-215).  
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In spite of its limited range, growth is the core measure of the development of the economy of 
a country at the macro level. Hence, the growth in GDP will be the best measure of the 
development of the economy from one year to the next in the quantitative analysis. The 
analysis is conduced on a macro country level. The qualitative analysis focuses on economic 
output at the business meso level, consequently, the measure of economic development will 
be economic progress for the businesses rather than the economy as a whole.  
 
Empirical investigations on the link between trust and economic development support growth 
in GDP as a measure of the dependent variable, as presented in Table 2.2.  Thus, although 
growth in GDP does not capture distribution; it is a comparable and clear measure of 
development (Bjørnskov 2003; Cutright 1963; Diamond 1992; Jackman 1973).  
 
Table 2.2 Measures of economic development in social capital–related theory  
 
Autor       Measurement  
Evans 1996      Growth in GDP * 
La Porta 1997      Growth in GDP 
Knack and Keefer 1997    Growth in GDP 
Temple 1998      Growth in GDP 
Nayaran 1999      Household income 
Collier and Gunning 1999    Growth in GDP 
Zak and Knack 2001     Growth in GDP  
Woolcock 2001     Growth in GDP * 
Knak Zak 2003     Growth in GDP 
Beugelsdijk 2004     Growth in GDP 
Neace 2004      Growth, entrepreneuring  
Krishna 2004      Index of development performance  
Francois et al. 2004     Production, entrepreneurship  
Bengtsson, Berggren, Jordahl 2005   Growth in GDP 
Bjørnskov 2006     Growth in GDP 
*These authors have not conducted empirical studies, but acknowledge growth in GDP through discussion and 
usage of articles that did use growth in GDP in empirical investigations. 
2.4 How does trust lead to economic development? 
In this section I will outline a theoretical understanding of why trust affects economic 
development, measured as per capita growth quantitatively, and as the economic output for 
firms qualitatively. Four hypotheses will be formulated.  
 
The inclusion of norms and social values in the economic development debate is nothing new. 
Modernization theory, for example, analyzed processes of broad social change in connection 
with economic outcomes. It aimed to explain sources of economic development from these 
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processes, and investigated how this influenced democracy (Lipset 1959). Two main 
directions can be distinguished within modernization theory: the Weberian, which focuses on 
the psychological and cultural elements, versus the system-oriented approach emphasizing the 
integration of social differences in the systems and structures (Arat 1988; Randall 1985: 20-
22). The former direction of modernization theory is relevant here, as it highlighted voluntary 
and civic organizations as the basis for social pluralism nurturing democracy. Already in the 
Weberian tradition economic issues were thus mixed into the sociology, where what can be 
called social capital were central in those concerns (Weber 1978; Woolcock 1998). 
Introducing the concept of “Enforceable trust”, Weber (1978) suggested that different kinds of 
institutions and groups used different mechanisms for ensuring compliance with rules and 
agreements. Bureaucracies used contracts, while family and other informal relations used 
social forms of security. Also memberships in golf clubs, which counted as an indicator of 
social capital, could be helpful in oiling the wheels of business life (Bourdieu 1984: 291). And 
these mechanisms of compliance had a positive impact on the economy
6
.  
 
Initially, the idea of describing social ties as capital was a metaphor, implying that social 
connections can be profitable, like other forms of capital. One can invest in it and expect 
efficiency gains from non-economic goods (Paxton 1999). This is highly simplified but places 
social capital within the economic term (Fields 2003: 12-13). Furthermore, Granovetter 
argues that all economic action is inherently enmeshed in social relations of one configuration 
or another (Granovetter 1985). But how does social capital pay off? 
 
There is broad consensus in the literature that economic development depends on two main 
contributors: Investment and labour productivity. This is called the Solow model. The latter is 
defined as output per person per hour (The world bank, wdi online  2007). Extensive empirical 
work supports that an increase in investment and labour productivity leads to an increase in 
economic development (Barro 1997; Romer 1990).  
 
So, the worker needs to have incentives to work harder, which first and foremost relies on his 
belief in the possibility of higher wages or other forms of benefits. This reflects a form of 
                                                 
6
 There is a vast amount of literature on other sources of economic development. The post-war literature has 
been dominated by some main theories: The linear stages of growth model, the theories and patterns of structural 
change, the international dependence revolution and the neoclassical free market counterrevolution, and the later 
more actor-oriented approach. I will not discuss this, since it is not directly relevant to or within the scope of this 
thesis. For further readings, see Baran (1975), Bauer (1984), Buchanan (1954), Fei and Ranis (1964), Lewis 
(1954), Nurkse (1953), Rostow (1959), Solow (1994, 1999), Meier (2001), Hall (2001) Shapiro (1999).   
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investment from the worker in expectation of future reward: He invests in work, in order to 
get something back. The expectation of some kind of reward is precisely the core of an 
investment mechanism: If you invest in something, you have the optimistic idea that it will 
pay off in the future; a forward looking expectation which is critically influenced by trust. 
Investment requires an optimistic behaviour which in turn is determined by the level of trust 
in a functioning system. Trust in the government and also trust in the legal system imply that 
the investor has confidence in the sanctioning potential of the state, which in turn makes him 
invest since he feels safe. But the first and foremost trust needed is in the person you work for 
or do business with. This leads to the argument that trust has a positive effect on investment, 
which in turn is crucial for economic development. 
 
Thus, first, if an investor feels safe and trusts his surroundings, he develops the opportunistic 
behaviour necessary for investing, as trust is a risk-reducing factor (Luhmann 1979). 
Secondly if the worker trusts his boss, and/or also trusts the legal system and the government 
to protect him from being exploited by his boss, this gives incentives to work harder and 
invest in more productivity per hour. Thirdly, a general trust by the capitalist in his workers 
also facilitates investment, as he counts on his workers to form a secure part of his business 
team.  
 
Consequently, both general trust in other people (workers trust the boss, workers trust workers, 
and the boss trusts his workers) and trust in institutions (the workers and the boss trust the 
government, the legal system, and the capitalist system) is crucial for the variation in 
fundamental indicators of economic development, investment and labour productivity. As 
Ana Laura Fernandez from the Uruguayan Chamber of Commerce and Service provided one 
example, saying: “The law of collective negotiation increases the trust in institutions because 
the law secures [the worker] the right to influence the conditions of his work” (Fernandez 
2009). She pointed to the workers feeling of influence, caused by trust in the institutions, as 
important for productivity.  
 
Before looking more into the transfer mechanisms, the rationality of trust will be briefly 
introduced. Is it really rational to trust other people? I argue that agents often trust one another, 
and that trust is often repaid, given that the individuals have a time perspective and that 
sanction mechanisms are in place (Bruni and Sugden 2000: 2). Even though Torsvik (2004: 
264-265) stress that the notion of trust is restricted to situations where there are no third 
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parties (sanction mechanisms) involved, I have argued that third parties such as networks and 
institutions always will be present where there is trust, since they are the sources of trust. 
Further, I have argued that trust and sanctions are additive (Humphrey 1998: 43). In a long 
time perspective it is not necessarily the threat of punishment that makes people trust, trust 
has become the rational choice. This is illustrated by figure 2.1: Juan and Maria are trading.   
 
Figure 2.1 Trust affects investment behaviour 
 
Source: Torsvik 2004: 263 
 
Trust is necessary for Juan to stake money on a trade. The figure shows that if Maria and Juan 
hold a no-trust relation, there will be no trade and hence no money. Given that Juan trusts 
Maria, but she does not trust him - a moderate-trust relation, Maria will gain money, but Juan 
will lose. This will be the case if it is the only trade they engage in because Maria has the 
option of gaining more and she knows that Juan trust her. If both trust each other, a high-trust 
relation, both will gain money and the total amount of economic output will be higher than the 
lower trust-relations. However, this requires that both have a time perspective and that both 
have learned that no trusting in the end will give no trade.  
 
In an imaginary total economic output, no trust gives 0 $. One-way trust gives 40$, while 
mutual trust gives 60$.  
Juan 
Maria 
Trust 
Trust 
No trust 
No trust 
TRADE 
TRADE 
NO TRADE 
NO TRADE 
Juan: 30 $ 
Maria: 30$   
Juan: -10 $ 
Maria: 50 $ 
Juan: 0 $ 
Maria: 0 $ 
$ 40 
$ 60 
60 
$ 0 
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2.4.1 The rationality of trust 
Economic theory rests on the principle of individuals acting rationally. There have been 
endless discussions of the characteristics of rational behaviour and the scope of the 
description, which I will not go into within the framework of this thesis. Nevertheless, the 
main purpose of this work is to place trust within the boundaries of economic variables, 
explaining economic output. I will thus give a brief discussion of whether it is rational to trust 
or not. Do economic actors, that is to say all consuming people, understand that they are better 
off if they cooperate for the common good? Is the reasoning behind the figure of Juan and 
Maria trading present in the consumer’s mentality? I will argue that cooperation - not 
necessarily fruitful for the individual itself in the short run- can be counted as rational 
behaviour.  
 
If cooperative action is to be achieved, individuals must trust that the people with whom they 
cooperate will not act contrary to shared objectives (Putnam 1993: 163-164 in Wollebaek and 
Selle 2002). First of all, the main modern conventional account for the rationality of trust is 
based on the idea of reputation. As a trader or consumer you care about your economic self 
interest, and the reputation you leave behind (Bruni and Sugden 2000). This is also according 
to what Hume states is the primary motive for justice, viz self-interest. Hume stresses that 
there are three rules of justice in society to make the common goal of increasing your material 
property possible: The stability of possession, the transference of possession by agreement, 
and the performance of promises (Hume 1888). The laws are necessary because justice is too 
impartial for humans to have natural sentiment for it. They can only feel human compassion, 
first and foremost for relatives and friends. Self-interest is hence the primary motive for 
justice. However, rational behaviour in the name of self-interest can then promote cooperation 
and also action where the individual gets no direct advantages in the first place. With a time 
perspective, it is rational to cooperate and it is rational to behave with solidarity (Todaro 2000; 
Torsvik 2003). 
 
Secondly, cooperative networks of civic engagement tend to promote trust, because a person’s 
reputation in one social setting or network easily transfers to other networks. Person with 
networks will therefore have incentives to preserve their reputation wherever they are 
(Granovetter 1985; Putnam 1993). The justice according to Hume will function by punishing 
a person through reputational sanctions. Conversely, a person's opportunistic actions in one 
association may exclude him from benefits in others (Bruni and Sugden 2000).  
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This reputation-based trust is an individualistic, ego-philosophical approach to the rationality 
of trust. Hollis argues that this approach fails to capture the social conception of what persons 
are: role-related and products of their obligations (Hollis 1998).  Rationality is, according to 
Hollis, a collective matter developed in a group. “Thus, social institutions do not merely set 
the parameters within which rational choices are made; they influence the content of 
rationality itself (Bruni and Sugden 2000: 27).  
 
Trust fits into both the collective and individualistic approach to rationality: Individualistic in 
the sense of self-interest as the foundation for all actions, collective because the collectiveness 
in many cases promotes the self-interest case. Given this brief discussion of trust as rational, 
one can develop the theoretical expectation that trust can have economic payoffs. If Maria 
trusts Juan and vice versa, the total output is the biggest in the long run.  
2.4.2 Transfer mechanisms  
We have seen that trust can have positive outcomes, including in the economy. Spontaneously, 
trust gives the association that all sorts of things simply will go smoother, in social, economic, 
and political life. But how does it promote economic growth specifically?  What are the micro 
transfer channels of social trust to a measurable economic output? Torsvik states that a good 
explanation of differential economic success must satisfy one crucial requirement: the 
mechanisms of how the variable works must be clearly presented (Torsvik 2004: 257). He 
thinks the theory of social capital fails this standard, but I argue that the transfer mechanisms 
can be clearly presented.  
 
Trust is, at its core, a set of institutionalized expectations that actors will reciprocate 
cooperative overtures to each other (Boix 1998; Knack and Keefer 1997: 1252). All economic 
activity that requires agents to believe in others or their actions is best in high trust 
environments, and societies where force is an instrument prior to cooperation are less 
effective and pleasant (Gambetta 1990). According to this logic, cooperation should be central 
to all mechanisms in the transfer channels. But cooperation is a vague concept - cooperation 
in what, and where? I will present the three main transmission channels emphasized in this 
thesis: transaction costs, productivity and investment. I focus on these mechanisms because 
they are rooted in my theoretical framework and they all rely on trust on the micro level. A 
fundamental challenge in investigating trust in economic exchange is extending an individual-
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level phenomenon to an organizational/society-level of analysis. This is a challenge because 
one may commit a cross-level fallacy (Rousseau 1985). However, social capital can constitute 
a macro level characteristic when aggregated to country level. Further, I specify theoretically 
who trusts whom: The individual members of a firm rather than the firms themselves are the 
trusting figures even though the firms get the advantages. For example, in lowering 
transaction costs for a firm, it is the micro level individuals that trust each other, lowering the 
costs of the organization-level firm they represent. The general hypothesis is thus:  
 
Social capital has a positive effect on economic development in Latin America.  
 
In the following I will elaborate on how this relationship holds.  
 
Transaction costs  
 
“The inability of societies to develop effective, low-cost enforcement of 
contracts is the most important source of both historical stagnation and 
contemporary underdevelopment in the Third World” (North 1990: 54).  
 
Transactions are a key element in development according to North. Nobel laureate Kenneth 
Arrow agrees, writing that virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element 
of trust, and certainly any transaction conducted over a period of time does (Arrow 1972: 357). 
The logic behind his argument is that if you trust and know people well, it is more likely that 
the transaction first of all takes place, secondly goes smoothly, and thirdly lowers the costs 
related to transactions. The importance of lowering transaction costs is reflected by the 
existence of a broad literature highlighting transaction costs as a crucial part of economic 
organization. A central part of this transaction costs literature is how operating parts in an 
organization should relate one to another (Williamson 1981: 549). In relating to each other, 
trust holds a key position.   
 
Zak and Knack (2001) conducted an experiment which illustrates the impact of trust on 
investment and transactions in contract making. Consumers were randomly matched to an 
investment broker for a short period. The consumers showed the degree to which they trusted 
their brokers by the amount of time they spent verifying the broker’s history of 
trustworthiness.  The more time the consumer spent on verifying the broker, the less time 
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he/she could spend on production and wage-earning activities. In the experiment, they 
assumed that the consumers only could access capital through the brokers (Zak and Knack 
2001: 296-297). None of the consumers knew the brokers beforehand, which could well be 
the case in real life experiences. The network of a consumer could thus be an advantage in the 
more solid foundation for trusting the broker, which would lower the time spent on 
controlling or verifying the broker.  
 
Thus firstly, contract making in a transaction goes more smoothly with trust between the 
contract makers. The smoothness of this operation does not only, or even necessarily, include 
skipping formal procedures, but refers to how much time they spend on assuring the 
credibility of the contract-making part (Fuscaldo 2009). If you require an assessment or bank 
account transcript in advance, you will use more time and resources on the transaction than if 
you have reasons for trusting the person in the first place, reflected by the experiment of Zak 
and Knack (2001).  
 
Secondly, transaction cost can also refer to how much time you spend looking for a proper 
partner to transact with. Personal connections or former experience with possible partners 
promote a trust experience that will ease the process.  
 
Furthermore, societies with a high stock of social trust are less dependent on formal 
institutions to enforce agreements. Informal credit markets is dependent on strong 
interpersonal trust that can facilitate investment where there is no well-developed formal 
system of financial intermediation, or where a lack of assets limits access to bank credit 
(Knack and Keefer 1997: 1253). When having a time horizon, the buyer can develop a trust 
relationship with a seller, without formal institutions in place (Kollock 1994: 314). In order to 
run an informal business you need customers or investors who are willing to take the risk of 
buying something unauthorized, not marked by content or not bearing an already known 
brand. According to Luhmann (2000: 95), “[…] trust is a solution for specific problems of 
risk”. This is highly evident in Latin America, where there is a culture for “ferias”, markets, 
and the economic informalism is considerable (Schneider 2007b). In Uruguay, the informal 
economy was 36.9 percent in 2007 (Brasca et al. 2009; Lombardi 2009), which was a subject 
of concern for many of the interview subjects. I argue that trust is needed in the informal 
business for two reasons. First of all, the consumer must trust the seller’s quality and price 
level. Trust is required because there are neither formal price regulations nor á priori security 
 24 
of quality. Secondly, the consumer must trust the mechanisms of social punishment if the 
quality of the products appears to fail. The total lack of transaction costs for the seller, as he is 
doing an informal business with no fees or additional costs is based on the trust mechanism 
between him and the consumer. Informal business can function within such communities if 
the members trust each other and feel no need for formal compliance with quality measures.  
 
Dell´Anno (2008) finds empirical evidence showing that both the informal and formal 
economic sectors are fruitful in Latin American countries. This is because the unofficial 
economy to a certain degree competes with the formal economy and forces efficiency. 
Informal economy is thus considered as beneficial to sustain economic growth (Dell´Anno 
2008: 185). A certain positive influence of the shadow economy on the efficient functioning 
and development of the official economy can thus be expected (Schneider 2007b).  
 
However, excessively close ties in transactions, or in other words abusing contacts and 
network for personal gains, can in some cases be called corruption. Corruption harms the 
economy by transferring funds from public purposes to private gain, which slows economic 
growth (Uslaner 2004: 5). Trust in expected to prevent such abuse of personal contacts.  
 
Let us take the Principal agent theory (PAT) as a point of departure for explaining this.  
According to PAT, a principal delegates power to an agent for the agent to act in the 
principal’s interest. This is a common form of power pyramid in any kind of democracy 
within states, organizations or firms. The problem occurs when the agent does not act in the 
interest of the principal, but rather in his own interest, or that of a person X who bribes him 
(Della Porta 1999). Trust between the principal and agent is thus fundamental to avoid 
corruption. If the principal does not trust his agent, he will need a bigger apparatus of control, 
which raises the costs of transaction between them. Consequently, trust is expected to 
contribute to the equilibrium between unnecessarily high transaction costs – and damagingly 
low transaction costs. “Social capital, measured as the extent to which people in a given 
society trust fellow citizens, is a significant cause of less corruption” states Bjørnskov and 
Uslaner (Bjørnskov 2003: 3; Uslaner 2002)
7
. 
 
                                                 
7
 Although the causality of social capital and corruption could be endogenous (an honest population that enforces 
the law fairly and provides little opportunity for private gain, can lead people to having greater faith in each 
other), Uslaner shows empirically that the causality goes from trust to less corruption (Uslaner 2002: 3).  
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Trust thus oils the machinery of business-making. “In short, the supply of a commodity in 
many respects complementary to those usually thought of as economic goods is not itself 
accomplished in the marketplace but rather comes as an unrequited transfer” (Arrow 1972: 
346). Hence, the first hypothesis about the mechanisms that link trust and growth is:  
 
H1: Trust lowers transaction costs. 
 
Productivity 
Labour productivity is a crucial factor for economic development (Lewis 1954; Schumpeter 
1962). Thus, an increase in labour productivity promotes growth. However, the worker needs 
to have incentives to work harder, which first and foremost rely on his belief in higher wages, 
safety or other forms of benefits. The expectance of some kind of reward is precisely the core 
of this mechanism: If you invest in something, in this case harder work, you have the 
optimistic idea that it will pay off in the future, a forward looking expectation which is 
critically influenced by trust. 
 
If the worker trusts his boss, and/ or trusts the legal system and the government to protect him 
from being exploited by his boss, this gives incentives to work harder and “invest” in more 
productivity per hour. Workers in a high-trust relationship are more likely to give that 
something extra. It promotes a positive motivational force which enhances efficiency (Sako 
2006: 7).  Furthermore, following the argument of trust saving time in transactions, trust in a 
society can be defined as the aggregate time that agents do not spend in verifying others' 
actions. Stated in other words, the time the agents save on securing a business can be used for 
production instead (Zak and Knack 2001: 303; Knack and Keefer 1997).  
 
Thus, trust has a positive effect on productivity which in turn has a positive effect on 
economic growth. This transfer mechanism between trust and growth leads to the second 
hypothesis:  
 
H2: Trust has a positive effect on productivity. 
 
 
Investment  
Zak and Knack (2001) show empirically in their article “Trust and growth” that low trust 
environments reduce the rate of investment. In allocating economic resources, both depositors 
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and lenders are exposed to risks in solving the optimization problem that normally occurs. 
How much these risks matter and shape the negotiating of course depends on institutions, but 
within that institution building, trust plays an important role (Calderon et al. 2002). 
 
Further, in trading, when you buy something from a stranger, you do not necessarily know if 
this person is charging you the right price, or if the object you buy is of the quality that you 
are willing to pay a certain amount of money for. So why trust the seller and do the deal? 
Experimental studies show that people tend to trust sellers or other people even though there 
are no rational reasons for it (Torsvik 2003). One possible explanation is that there exist some 
sanctions of punishment for such cheaters: Formal institutions, such as for example security 
companies and judicial systems, and informal institutions such as the feeling of guilt 
associated with violating moral norms, 'afterlife sanctions' associated with religious dictates, 
bad social reputation, and loss of profits through business-related reputational effects (Zak 
and Knack 2001: 298). Investments occur within a social structure, and this structure 
determines the rewards for cooperation or penalties for deviation (Becker 1974; Zak and 
Knack 2001: 299).  
 
Due to differences in both formal and informal possibilities of sanctions, social trust is 
expected to vary between societies and countries. If you know that the possibility of revealing 
or punishing a cheating seller is small, you will as a consequence trust him less. However, 
social networks also constitute sanctioning possibilities, as informal institutions. If a person is 
part of a network, the possibility of reputational sanctions is large and the person is 
consequently best off by acting trustworthy. Thus, there will be reasons for trusting the 
surroundings. Hence, trust has a twofold task in increasing investment: First, it strengthens the 
informal institutions, by being a resource of control and sanction mechanism. Secondly, given 
that the institutions are in place, trust makes you invest more and also more quickly. Both 
these forms of trust lead to a better environment for investment, indirectly and directly. As De 
la Rua highlighted in 2001, trust was fundamental in order to get Argentinean investment 
back on its feet. Further, Bjørnskov stresses the risk-reducing factor of social trust. High 
social trust can make a society more stable and predicable, which gives firms better incentives 
for long-term investment (Bjørnskov 2003: 6-7).  
 
Trust also has a positive impact on innovation. People with a higher level of trust are more 
likely to engage in innovation processes since they believe their ideas will be listened to and 
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may be useful (Clegg 2002: 410). This in turn promotes investments, as many types of firms 
and investment actions rely on continuous technical innovation.  
 
On the basis of this theoretical passage, I formulate the third hypothesis:  
 
H3: Trust promotes investment. 
 
Figure 2.2 The link between trust and economic development  
 
 
 
2.4.3 The endogenity issue  
Endogenity refers to the problem of knowing the direction of causality. Which came first, the 
chicken or the egg? Stated differently, values of the explanatory variable could be a 
consequence, rather than a cause, of the dependent variable (King et al. 1994: 185).  
 
Economic policy can affect the behaviour of social actors. For example, in a country with well 
established institutions that can secure the effectiveness of the judicial system and the police 
the inhabitants would probably be more trusting since, as described earlier in the theory 
section, trust develops better with sanctioning mechanisms in place. Following this logic, the 
causality of my research question is turned upside down.  
 
The data for researching the questions and hypotheses of this thesis are collected and 
observed in the real world. This inhibits the total control and manipulation of variables which 
can be conducted in an experimental study, suitable for fully controlling the endogenity 
problem. However, I am not the first to investigate the explanatory power of trust on growth.  
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Frequently cited and well-known articles on trust have supported the direction of the causality 
both theoretically and methodologically (Bjørnskov 2009; Coleman 1988; Francois 2005; 
Glaeser et al. 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; Knack 2003; Zak and Knack 2001; Bjørnskov 
2006a). Furthermore, the theoretical expectations for my empirical investigation are clear as 
regards the direction of causality. All the scholars studied in this chapter, from the macro-
centred approach and the community-centred approach stress the effect of trust on economic 
output (Bourdieu 1983; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Clegg 2002; Coleman 1988; Dasgupta 1999; 
Francois 2005; Fukuyama 1996; Glaeser 2002; Grootaert 2002; Neace 2004; Putnam 1993, 
2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2005; Van Oorschot 2005; Weber 1978). I thus 
rely on extensive theoretical work when claiming the direction of causality between trust and 
economic development.  
2.5 Control variables 
There are numerous factors that theoretically are expected to have considerable impact on 
economic development in Latin America, many of them with even greater impact than trust. 
In the quantitative analysis control variables are therefore needed. Following conventional 
economic development theory, the control variables are: Population growth, Level of GDP 
(PPP), Investment share and human capital (Barro 1997; Romer 1990; Benhabib 1994; 
Levine 1992; Ramey and Ramey 1995). All the control variables are expected to have a 
positive effect on the level of economic development. As these are included in this thesis 
mainly for methodological reasons, they will be dealt with in the methodology chapter.  
2.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter has presented the concept of social capital, and shown through a discussion of 
the literature that trust is a core concept in social capital theory, independent of its sources. 
Furthermore, the theory demonstrates that trust can be highly rational, and is expected to pay 
off economically, which lays the ground for the general hypothesis of the thesis: trust 
increases economic development. The theoretical causal reasoning behind the hypothesis is 
that trust is expected to lower transaction costs (H1), increase production (H2) and increase 
investments (H3). The general hypothesis will be empirically examined in a multiple 
regression analysis, before I use process-tracing to investigate the three hypotheses in a 
qualitative case study of Uruguay. 
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3 METHODOLOGY, DATA AND MEASUREMENT  
 
In this chapter I will discuss the methodological procedures used to investigate if and how 
trust affects variation in economic development. According to the social capital analyst 
Krishna, a combination of case-study and statistical methods should be employed to study the 
impact of trust (Krishna 2004: 207). My point of departure is a quantitative approach, namely 
a multiple regression analysis, which is used because it enables an evaluation of the possible 
existence of a general relationship between growth and trust in Latin America. Trust is 
aggregated to a macro level and constitutes a national property. At the same time, I argue that 
the case-oriented approach is useful for exploring the mechanisms behind the causality: How 
does trust affect economic development? I select the specific case for a case-oriented 
qualitative analysis based on the quantitative analysis. Uruguay turns out as the country with 
the highest value on the most pertinent variable in the analysis, social capital. This indicates 
that it might be a particularly good case for tracing how the mechanisms of trust functions. As 
social capital is an individual micro level concept in the qualitative analysis, elite interviews 
are used to explore behavioural patterns among the micro level creators of economic 
development: Business leaders in Uruguay. Problems and challenges with both the regression 
analysis and the case study of Uruguay will be treated and weighted thoroughly. I will first 
present the methodological procedures and the arguments for my selected. Secondly, the data 
and the operationalization will be discussed, and finally, issues regarding bias, validity and 
reliability of data will be treated, as well as my strategies to overcome these obstacles.  
3.1 A combination of goods 
“Research in social science should be both general and specific” 
King et al. 1994: 43. 
 
There are several approaches to causality
8
. Each has affinities with different methods. Hence, 
in order to approach causality from different angles, the best approach is a combination of 
methods (Johnson 2004; Mahoney 1999; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003).  
                                                 
8
 Four types are explicitly mentioned by Bennett  and Elmann (2006): a neo-Human regularity approach which 
establishes causation through constant conjunction and correlation. The counterfactual approach that compares 
similar worlds and asks whether differences can be attributed to a change in a particular cause; The manipulation 
account investigates the effects of manipulating a cause in a controlled setting. And causation that can be thought 
of as a process involving the mechanisms that lead from cause to effect. The neo-Human regularity requires 
large-n regression analysis; for counterfactual and manipulation theories the experimental research is consistent, 
and case studies are best in the search for mechanisms and capacities (Bennett and Elman 2006). 
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Both statistical quantitative studies and case-oriented qualitative studies aim to establish 
empirical relationships between variables while controlling for the effects of other variables 
(Liphart 1971). They differ in their relation between variables and cases. While the small-n 
case-study seeks to maximize the variance of the independent variable in a small number of 
cases, the quantitative study is variable-oriented, aiming at generalization to a broader 
universe of cases (Liphart 1971: 685-686). The most appropriate method for establishing 
inferences is a much debated issue (George and Bennett 2005; King et al. 1994; Liphart 
1971; Ragin 1987). However, they can be both be used for inferences, and should be seen 
as complementary methods rather than as rival ones, and also as a desirable mix, mitigating 
the strengths and weaknesses found in single method designs to better reflect reality (Jick 
1979: 602).
9
 In this respect, the combination of two methods is the best choice to meet  
what Skocpol calls the main challenge of social science: The doubly engaged question, 
answering a real world question and at the same time respecting theoretical and 
methodological considerations (Skocpol 1979).  
 
Whether and how trust can explain variation in economic output in Latin America is a good 
example of a double engaged question. First because it is rooted in the real world - the 
variation in economic development is of great concern to the inhabitants of a continent, and 
secondly because it aims to test the theory of social capital and also investigate the possible 
transfer mechanisms. According to Downward (2006) the best way to conduct this research is 
by combining a quantitative large-n study with process tracing in a qualitative case study. The 
quantitative approach is superior at identifying causal effects, whether trust explains variance 
in economic development, while with the case-study elaborates on how (King et al. 1994: 84).  
3.2 The effect of causes - Regression analysis in search of causal inference  
To investigate whether trust has an effect on economic development requires a complex 
procedure. In revealing complex relations, the qualitative method is considered superior, 
capable of preserving this complexity (George and Bennett 2005). I will look more closely at 
the causal mechanisms, but first, it is crucial to investigate whether there is a tendency of a 
general relationship between trust and economic growth. Thus, I use a quantitative method 
and a multiple regression analysis as a tool because I seek a general knowledge of a 
relationship, concerning a whole continent (King et al. 1994; Skog 2004). The tool is 
                                                 
9
 Among many interesting projects where triangulation is used, see Stokes (2001) and Mendelberg (2001). 
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appropriate for my research question as it first of all, conducted correctly, enables an 
estimation of the strength of a causal relationship: To what extent does trust have an effect on 
economic growth? Secondly, when including several variables in a multivariate model, I will 
be able to determine the relationships between all variables in the analysis, and check for the 
effect of trust, while keeping other variables relevant for economic performance constant  
(Hair et al. 2006; Midtbø 2007). According to Lijphart, you “[…]cannot be sure that a 
relationship is true unless the influence of other variables is controlled for” (Liphart 1971: 
683). Hence, the complexity of the question is taken into account, while giving a general 
answer.  
 
Trust is considered as neither crucial nor sufficient for alone increasing economic output. 
Hence I claim “no more than that the type of independent variable in question appears to 
favour – make more likely – the occurrence of a certain type of outcome” (George and 
Bennett 2005: 190). In a regression analysis I will still be able to estimate the strength of the 
relationship, whether it is strong or not
10
. 
 
In a regression analysis, the effects are normally estimated on the basis of a sample (selection 
of units), made from a population (all units). Generalizing and predicting of results from the 
sample which hold for the whole population require significance testing to avoid identifying 
spurious relationships. I write prediction because the probabilistic relationships in social 
science do not permit, in contrast to nature-like phenomenon investigated in chemistry or 
physics, the exact calculation of relations. However, I use all the Latin American countries 
but Cuba and Haiti in my analysis
11
. These count 19 countries when including Puerto Rico. 
Since I aim to generalize only to the countries included, significance tests are not as relevant, 
because I am not generalizing to additional (unobserved) cases. For a further discussion on the 
                                                 
10
 The mathematical expression of my analysis is the following:  
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The ordinary least square (OLS) equation aims to minimize the sum of squared errors. This means to adjust the 
regression line so that it corresponds in the best possible way with the data (Skog 2004).  In this equation Y is 
economic output, X1 is social capital and X
2,3
 are the control variables theoretically expected to have an impact 
on economic output. e is the error term, which represents the variation in the dependent variables caused by 
unknown factors. The coefficients b show the effect on the dependent variable when the independent variables 
change one unit, with all others held constant (Hair et al. 2006; Midtbø 2007). 
11
 Due to lack of democracy and instability it is challenging to conduct surveys in respectively Cuba and Haiti, 
and neither Latinobarómetro nor World Value Survey conduct surveys there.  
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importance of significance testing see among others Cox (1977), Morrison and Henkel (1970) 
and Cohen (1990).  
 
My analysis is restricted to the period from 1996 to 2007 due to the limited availability of 
trust data. Latinobarómetro’s data collection for most of the countries started in 1996. Hence I 
use the data from all years available. I use the mean of those years in a cross sectional model 
which contributes to robustness without causing unnecessary autocorrelation, and most 
importantly a variation caused by randomness.  The reason why I do not use annual data is a 
theoretical one; trust is not expected to vary much over short periods of time (Portes and 
Sensenbrenner 1993; Putnam 1993, 2000; Rothstein 2005; Van Oorschot 2005). If there is any 
annual variation it is most likely random and insignificant (Bjørnskov 2006a). However, over 
longer periods of time, higher levels of trust should be associated with higher levels of growth 
and development.  
  
I conduct the analysis in two steps. First I include the conventional economic control variables 
that are assumed to have an influence on economic output. In step two I include the 
explanatory variable, trust. This two-step procedure is done to verify if the explanatory effect 
of the model increases with the inclusion of trust
12
.  
3.2.1 Bias precautions  
To prevent bias, I need to deal with some elements: Outliers are single units that are highly 
distinguished from the rest of the sample, affecting the coefficient in a disproportionate 
manner. Multicolinearity means that some of the independent variables overlap in explaining 
variation in the dependent variable, which makes it difficult to know which of the variables 
explain what. Conducting preliminary descriptive univariate and bivariate analyses before the 
multivariate regression will help to map out possible problems and avoid such sources of bias 
(Pennings 2006:152-164; Hair et al. 2006). As already mentioned, major problems of 
autocorrelation are avoided by aggregating time units. Other assumptions that will be dealt 
with are specification error, normally distribution of the dependent variable, and non-
correlated error terms (Hair et al. 2006).  
                                                 
12
 The adjusted R square is used as a measure of the explanatory effect of the model, as it adjusts for bias 
concerning the number of variables included in the analysis, in contrast to adjusted R which tends to increase 
with the number of included variables. However, Achen (1982) argues that the importance of R² could be limited 
and that a low R² does not necessarily imply a low degree of the variance explained. The criticism consists of the 
variances being a function of the sample, not the underlying relationship. This criticism kept in mind; I still think 
the R square information is useful.  
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3.3 The cause of effects - Case study in search of descriptive inference  
In order to explore the underlying mechanisms of trust that might have an explanatory power 
on variation in the level of economic output, I use a qualitative case study. I will in the 
following section explain how the causes-of-effects approach is not a second-best strategy to 
be followed when circumstances do not allow the use of quantitative methods (Bennett and 
Elman 2006).  
 
A huge number of studies on the effect of trust on the economy exists, but only a few 
emphasize the function of the mechanisms and the nature of how this relationship works
13
 
(Torsvik 2004: 266). A deep and extensive study permits close attention to the complexity of 
a phenomenon viz. trust and is hence appropriate in order to elaborate on explanations of the 
theoretically explained link (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003: 305). Intensive, versus 
extensive, does not only refer to the number of units of analysis in this context, but also to the 
number of variables
14
. The fewer the cases studied, the more intensive the study may be, other 
factors being kept constant (Eckstein 1975: 83). I focus on the mechanism behind one 
explanatory variable in order to go deep, setting aside all the other explanations for variation 
in economic growth. While causal inferences made on the basis of one case, viz. Uruguay, 
have limited possibilities for immediate generalization, an intensive study offers the 
possibilities of detailed descriptions of the effect of social interaction and trust on economic 
output in this case, as well as the causal mechanisms involved (Ragin 1987; King et al. 1994; 
Polsby and Greenstein 1975). These can be used to generate hypotheses about the 
mechanisms in other cases.  
 
Case studies, as any other method, have their strengths and limitations. In this thesis, the case 
study’s inability to generalize should not be seen as a limitation, but rather as a trade-off 
between saying something general about trust and economic growth, and exploring this 
inference in depth (Collier 1997; Ragin 1987; Collier 1993; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 
2003; Gerring 2004). Another trade-off between the qualitative and quantitative method is 
parsimony versus breadth (King et al. 1994; Przeworski and Teune 1970). The parsimonious 
                                                 
13
 For quantitative work on the field, see among others: (Bjørnskov 2006a, 2006b; Francois 2005; Grootaert 
2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; Neace 2004; Van Oorschot 2005; Zak and Knack 2001) 
14
 This is a source of debate. One critique of qualitative work is that it is subject to the same causal inference 
rules of degrees of freedom, but lacks an awareness of this. This concern is treated in e.g. Campbell (1975) and 
Yin (1981).  
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model is rigid and clean at the expense of richness and broadness. In my case, the complex 
phenomenon investigated concerns social behaviour and its effect on economic performance, 
which requires a complex explanation. Following King et al (1994: 20) “The theory should be 
just as complicated as our evidence suggests”, parsimony versus breadth is not a question of 
inherent superiority, but a question of adapting theory and method to the nature of the 
research question. By using process-tracing I will acquire additional understanding of the 
complex mechanisms involved in this theoretic causality, as process tracing “[…] 
complements other research methods […] and contributes to theory development and testing 
in ways that statistical analysis cannot” (George and Bennett 2005: 207-208).   
3.3.1 The process-tracing method 
The process tracing method is able to identify intervening causal processes - the mechanisms 
that drive trust to cause an increase in economic output, in a world marked by multiple 
interaction effects (George and Bennett 2005: 206; Bennett and Elman 2006: 456 ). I thus 
establish causation not through comparison of cases, but by within-case research of how trust 
affects production, transaction costs and labour productivity in Uruguay (Bennett and Elman 
2006).  
 
I intend to be rigorous in the empirical investigation of the transfer mechanisms between trust 
and economic development. I thus follow Bennett and Elman (2006: 459-460) who establish 
some key points that make the within-case investigation more persuasive, all other factors 
kept constant.  First, the causality should be thoroughly investigated from the beginning to the 
end in order to make the identification of the process more robust. I first examine the degree 
of trust in the mentality of business leaders in Uruguay, which constitutes the beginning of the 
causal chain, and then identify how this affects their companies’ economic behaviour in 
specific ways. By carrying out interviews I manage to follow the chain from the beginning, 
the individual, to the end, the effect on economic outputs. However, the interview subjects 
could be biased due to their wish to appear in a positive light, which in turn could influence 
my understanding of the chain. This will be further discussed in the data part.  
 
Secondly, the preferred processes are those with no interruptions in their causality. In a 
complex causality chain this is difficult to control for. Many interruptions could occur on the 
long road between trusting persons at the starting point and economic output at the end. 
However, the causality is well described in the theory, and I will seek to fulfil the requirement 
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by carefully reading and referring to relevant theory at each step towards the outcome 
(George and Bennett 2005: 30). 
 
Thirdly, the process tracing will be stronger if the researcher is able to support the main link 
with diverse evidence. Within the framework of a master thesis, the number of kinds of 
evidence I am able to investigate is limited. However, I have conducted nine interviews, 
which constitute a minimum of diversity. I also support and challenge my findings with 
secondary data where this is available.  
 
Fourthly, the process tracing is also stronger if the evidence is inconsistent with other 
alternative explications. This is highly challenging and not even desirable in the investigated 
process of this thesis. Also, in general, social causality is often complex and multiple (Ragin 
1987). As will be shown in the analysis chapter, there are other important features that 
influence economic growth, and also the relationship between trust and growth. The small 
size of Uruguay is an example. However, I will describe the link between the trust and the 
economic advantages as relevant and important in comparison to other possible explanations, 
and also distinguish between them. This does not necessarily imply that other explanations are 
less important, but that social capital constitute an important variable.   
 
Finally, I shall avoid confirmation bias in my search for explaining economic output with 
social trust, and also seek other possible explanations. As mentioned, this is highly evident, 
since trust is neither the only nor the most important explanation for economic development 
(Ostrom 2000: 172). The qualitative interview data material has been treated critically in 
order to filter out the trust mechanisms and has been carefully validated to avoid confirmation 
bias.   
 
With the five key points in mind, process tracing in this thesis means to map out the existence 
of trust in the Uruguayan business culture, and interpret its importance in economic behaviour, 
decisions and possible success.  
3.4 Case selection 
I am developing hypotheses about causal mechanisms, which tend to be clearest in the cases 
with highest values on the explanatory variables (Eckstein 1975). Since the main focus in this 
thesis is the effect of trust, my primary concern is the value of the trust variable. Uruguay is 
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the case with the highest level of trust. According to the Latinobarómetro 27.3 percent of the 
population have high trust. However, Uruguay has the lowest level of economic growth, the 
dependent variable, next to Paraguay. Given the comparatively high level of social capital this 
is not consistent with the theoretical expectations. According to Liebermann (2005: 435), 
Uruguay is thus not a perfect choice, as he stresses that outliers - units with high or low values 
on both dimensions - are best for generating theoretical and empirical insights. Yet, I argue 
that the comparatively low level of growth mainly is explained by influential control variables. 
Furthermore, if the relationship between social trust and development is apparently weaker in 
Uruguay than in other Latin American countries, it is still an interesting case because 
whatever mechanisms appear to be at work they might be even more present elsewhere 
(Eckstein 1975: 119-120). 
 
When choosing Uruguay as the case of investigation due to its level on the most pertinent 
variable trust, I avoid the bias caused by selecting cases on the dependent variable. Such 
conditional independence is important in order to avoid bias that can cause an underestimation 
of the effects of the independent variable (King et al. 1994: 115-117).  
 
Figure 3.1 shows how Uruguay stands out from the sample in the most crucial dimension of 
this thesis, namely in the relationship between trust and economic growth 
 
Figure 3.1 The placement of Uruguay in the trust - economic growth dimension. 
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There are, however, some elements to be aware of concerning trust and its causal effect on 
economic development in Uruguay. First of all, Uruguay has one of the most internationally 
dependent economies in Latin America, and I conceptualize trust as a national characteristic. 
The majority of the big firms mainly export to Brazil (18.2%), China (9%), Argentina (7.1%), 
Germany (6.3%), Mexico (5.5%), Netherlands (4.4%), and Russia (4.2%) (IMF 2009a). The 
value of export in 2008 was $ 7.1 billion, which is quite high for a rather small country with a 
GDP in 2008 of $43.16 billion (Estadística 2009). This implies that Uruguayan business 
people carry out a lot of negotiation and business with foreigners, which in turn means that 
how trust works also depends on the level of trust in other countries.  I argue that this is not a 
source of bias: in the quantitative analysis trust is estimated through the question “In general, 
do you trust other people?” The emphasis is added by me, to underline that the question does 
not specify nationality. It maps out whether you trust people, not Uruguayans, Argentineans 
or people with a certain characteristic. Consequently, the attitudes of Uruguayan businessmen 
still represent the trust levels of Uruguay, doing business with whomever. Also, at the 
aggregate level, one could expect to find levels of trust and of trustworthiness to be correlated, 
which implies that the trust of Uruguayan businessmen is not necessarily dependent on other 
countries just because of the open economy (Nannestad 2008: 415). Nevertheless, I will take 
into consideration that businesspeople may have more contact with foreigners and the 
international environment than the average Uruguayan inhabitant. For the same reason, it is 
also important in the sample selection that all interview subjects are Uruguayan, and that the 
firms they represent are Uruguayan.   
 
Furthermore, according to the World Bank, 24.7 percent of the population lives under the 
poverty line. The unemployment rate in July 2009 was 8 percent, and the crime rate is 
characterized as quite high (Estadística 2009). Even though the country is comparatively 
developed in a Latin American context, it is still a developing country in a global context and 
has substantial social challenges
15
. This social reality is highly relevant in relation to 
Uruguayans´ conception of trust. They will base their foundation of trust on a different reality 
than Italians or Americans do, who were the original units of analysis for Putnams elaboration 
of the concept (Putnam 1993, 2000). Beyond awareness of the issue of conceptual stretching, 
which I will come back to in part 4.3, the issue of adapting my interview guide to this reality 
was crucial.  Also, I was fully aware of this fact when I carried out my field work. 
                                                 
15
 Uruguay is classified by IMF as an emerging and developing country (IMF 2009b).  
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3.4.1 The single case study 
Comparison between two or more cases can be an advantage, highlighting differences or 
similarities that help to keep all other than the independent variable constant (Landman 2008). 
Furthermore, one may argue that maximizing the n, even in qualitative studies, gives more 
robust results (King et al. 1994). However, in qualitative methodology, the within-case 
method is highly appropriate for investigation of causal mechanisms. Process tracing allows 
inferences about causal mechanisms within the confines of one single case (Bennett and 
Elman 2006: 459). As my focus is on the causality between trust and economic development, 
precisely by conducting process tracing, two or more cases are neither desirable nor necessary. 
Comparing Uruguay with another case would not necessarily increase my understanding of 
the mechanisms per se. Having one single case, Uruguay, on the contrary allows a deeper and 
more thorough analysis. The results from the analysis could be used for comparison at a later 
stage.  
3.5 Data 
The quality of the data is crucial in order to present unbiased results. According to King et al 
the control of data quality should be done in several ways (King et al. 1994: 27-28, 63-65, 97-
99). Data should be collected on as many of its observable implications as possible to better 
evaluate the theory. In order to fulfil this, I have collected both secondary and unique primary 
data from different sources. Primary data consist of interviews collected on a field trip. For 
secondary sources I use reports gathered during the field trip, as well as relevant literature 
found in journals and recommended from scholars in the field. This is supplemented by 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) ratings, and data from Latinobarómetro, La Pop and 
The World Bank. The combination of sources allows me to study the theory’s many 
implications of the theory (King et al. 1994). My effort to comply with the requirement of 
presenting the process of data generation, ensuring validity of measurement, and making 
replicable analysis will be presented below. First I describe the process, before I discuss 
validity.  
3.5.1 Quantitative data generation 
The data for the quantitative empirical section comes from three different sources, the 
Latinobarómetro, The World Value Survey and the World Bank.  
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Latinobarómetro is cross-national and contains survey data ten years back in time on 17 Latin 
American countries. The Dominican Republic was added to the survey in 2002. 
Latinobarómetro is  inspired by World Value Survey and European Social Survey, focusing 
on changes in attitudes, values and trust in democracies, institutions etc 
(www.latinobarometro.org). It is a non-profit NGO. The data are based on personal interviews 
with a random sample of approximately 19000 persons per year representing over 400 million 
people
16
. I use Latinobarómetro because it is the most complete survey dataset on Latin 
America with relevant variables. Where Latinobarómetro lacks data, data from the World 
Value Survey are supplied.  
 
There are some elements to be aware of when carrying out surveys in developing countries in 
general and Latin America in particular. These include the de facto freedom of speech, the 
poverty rate, literacy, infrastructure and linguistic diversity in the sample. The Latin American 
countries differ from each other on in his respect, although the freedom of speech with respect 
to the questions treated in Latinobarómetro is assumed to be good in the whole sample. There 
are great differences between the countries concerning their political situation. Some of the 
countries included in my analysis can be considered as having been authoritarian during the 
period of analysis (1996-2007)
17
 (The world bank, wdi online  2007). The poverty rate is a 
much bigger source of bias since it is difficult to interview very poor people both because of 
access to slum areas and because of lack of census data. In Rio de Janeiro in Brazil 
approximately 30 percent of the population lives in “favelas”, many of them too dangerous for 
an interviewer to enter. Nevertheless, poverty and literacy are taken into consideration as the 
data are weighted on education due to an over representation of well-educated people. The 
geographical representation has in recent years been good, following the actual demographic 
distribution of the inhabitants in each country. For example, in Bolivia, in 2007 64 percent 
was urban population and 36 percent rural. The sample for the survey is thus distributed 
proportionally. However, during the initial years of the survey, sampling in many countries 
was urban-biased. All the interviews are carried out in the official language of the country. 
This is also a potential source of bias as many of the Latin American countries included have 
indigenous groups of people who speak poor or no Spanish/Portuguese. 
                                                 
16
 The technique of personal interviews realized by going from door to door has the advantage of a higher 
response rate. However, it violates the sample criteria of randomness and may cause bias by over representing 
people who want to participate in survey activities.  
17
 Mexico, Colombia, Peru and Paraguay scored below 4.5 on a scale 1-7 between 1996 and 1999 on Freedom 
House democracy classification.  
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The interviews are carried out by professional firms in each country. The economic data is 
from the World Bank, which is widely used all over the world by scholars and researchers and 
considered to be reliable and suitable for comparisons.  
3.5.2 Qualitative data generation 
I got the primary data sources for the qualitative part of the thesis from interviews and reports 
carried out on a field work trip to Montevideo, Uruguay, over 3 weeks in August 2009. I did 
nine interviews during my stay: Seven with directors or subdirectors of big firms in Uruguay, 
and two with interest-organizations for the private business sector
18
. All interviews were 
carried out in Spanish. This was a clear advantage as the interview subjects felt more secure 
and were able to express themselves in their mother tongue. Also, I think they felt closer to 
me as an interviewer speaking Spanish, showing knowledge of and interest in their country.  
 
Arranging interviews on this topic by emailing to Uruguay from Norway proved difficult. I 
received a list of the biggest firms (in economic terms) from The National Chamber of 
Commerce of Uruguay, but with no contact information. Although I did manage to get in 
contact with a few relevant persons before I left for Uruguay, we did not make fixed 
appointments with time and date. Once settled in Montevideo, the personal contact made 
things easier. I used a snowball sampling approach to get relevant interview objects. This 
means that the interview objects themselves gave me recommendations and contacts to other 
relevant firm leaders (Thagaard 2009). This sample method is not problematic on this 
occasion since the sample is strategic, not random (George and Bennett 2005; Gerring 2004).  
 
The interviews were semi-structured. The reason for this is that semi-structured interviews are 
appropriate for the in-depth knowledge which I was seeking (Patton 1990). I used an 
interview guide (appendix 1) which I followed, though not rigorously. For example, it often 
happened that I changed the order of the questions if the interview subjects touched themes 
related to upcoming questions, or I asked follow-up questions in order to clarify issues and 
answers. On some occasions I did not have to ask all the questions, as the person himself 
brought up the relevant topics. Also, if the interview subject chose to speak about an 
interesting topic not included in the guide, I followed it up. There were also occurrences 
where the interview subjects talked about topics that were somewhat irrelevant as well. I tried 
                                                 
18
 See the complete list of interviews in table 3.1.  
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not to intervene too much in order to make him/her at ease and not to be rude, but at the same 
time, it is important that the interviewer sets the agenda for the conversation (Kvale 2008). 
Mapping out trust is not controversial or sensitive at this level of analysis. I did not ask 
questions that were perceived as very uncomfortable or threatening in any way and the 
interview subjects were quite relaxed. However, the interview subjects always wanted to give 
a good impression and appear in a positive light, which may be one source of bias in such data. 
The possibility of going to Uruguay and conducting interviews in Spanish, gave me unique 
first-hand data.  
 
Why Business leaders? 
One can think of many interesting interview subjects for mapping out how trust affects 
production, investment, transaction costs and labour productivity in Uruguay. However, this is 
a master thesis, and interviewing is a quite time-consuming activity. I thus had to limit my 
sample and try to make it as relevant and informative as possible. All the theoretical elements 
mentioned above are found in the everyday activities of a firm or organization of any kind. 
Business directors can have a significant impact on economic growth and the well-being of 
their communities (Neace 2004: 706). If the firm or organization deals with a big sum of 
capital, the amount of capital affected by the transmission channels will in turn be greater, 
which thus has a greater impact on the economy than a firm dealing with small sums of 
capital. My logic for choosing the biggest firms in Uruguay as my sample is thus the same as 
choosing Uruguay as a case: The units with the clearest and most explicit characteristics will 
give me the most information. Furthermore, the impact of the mechanisms in larger firms 
affects the Uruguayan economy on a larger scale.   
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Table 3.1 Interview subjects and their position 
 
Name    Position      Date 
Ana Laura Fernandez  Consultant in the National    10.08.09 
    Chamber of Commerce and Service    
Ignacio Bartesaghi  Consultant in the National     11.08.09 
    Chamber of Industry  
Gualberto Muñoz   Director of Human Resources,   12.08.09 
    Zenda Leather, tannery 
Isidoro Hodara   Director,      13.08.09 
    Zonamerica, free trade zone 
Nicolas Jodal   Director and       13.08.09 
    Founder of Artech, soft ware  
Marcelo Lombardi  Director of Tres Cruces     17.08.09 
    Shopping and Bus Terminal 
Elbio Fuscaldo                       Director of Pelsa, clothing factory    18.08.09 
    President Chamber of Clothing 
Jose Luis Rial                         Financial Director of     21.08.09 
    Conaprole, dairy  
Moises Maman  Director of Hisud, wool factory, President of 21.08.09 
    The Uruguayan Industrial Textile Association   
 
3.5.3 Bias in the data material  
The reports from the national Chamber of Commerce, the national Chamber of Industry as 
well as the documents from the firms, can be biased in trying to present Uruguay and the firm 
in a positive manner, defending their interest. Also, the access to second hand sources can be 
a potential source of bias. It is more difficult to access controversial material. The fact that 
Uruguay had presidential elections in October 2009, shortly after my interviews were 
conducted, also influenced both reports and my interview subjects. It happened more than 
once that my interview subjects turned their responses into political speeches supporting their 
preferred candidate, which was almost exclusively the opposition candidate. The fact that I 
am Norwegian, coming from a developed country, might also have influenced their reluctance 
to transmit the reality of their less developed country. Moreover, another source of bias in 
qualitative interviews is the desire to answer the right thing, in other words leaving a good 
impression of him/herself and the company to the interviewer (Ringdal 2001). It was thus 
important that I kept a poker face during the interview not revealing my expectations or 
preferences, but at the same time encouraging the person to continue speaking and to feel 
comfortable. A second concern in this matter was my presentation of the purpose of the 
interview. The interview subjects must be treated with respect and given information about to 
 43 
whom he/she is talking. This is an ethically important issue. Nonetheless, telling too much 
about my hypothesis could bias the answers.  
 
The reliability concern is more challenging as regards my primary data, since I will never 
know if the interview subjects would have given the same answers to a different interviewer. 
However, “for reliability to be calculated, it is incumbent on the scientific investigator to 
document his or her procedure” (Kirk 1986: 72). I taped and transcribed all the interviews. As 
regards reliability, although time-consuming, transcribing is preferable to summarizing or 
writing down key words, as it leaves the material in its original form unbiased by the 
researcher (Silverman 2006: 227). To meet this concern, all the interviews are transcribed in 
their original language, Spanish, which leaves little room for personal interpretation, and I 
used secondary literature to challenge or support the results. Finally, none of my interview 
objects are anonymous. This opens the possibility of contacting the interview subjects if that 
is seen as desirable or necessary. Also, they need to stand totally responsible for the 
information given as they are identified by name.  The requirement of reliability is easier to 
fulfil concerning the statistical data. All the data are available at the Department of 
Comparative Politics at the University of Bergen, and the dataset for this particular analysis is 
available from the author.   
3.6 Measurement  
3.6.1 Social trust in general 
Measuring complex social phenomena like trust requires a thorough consciousness (Sartori 
1970) both with respect to definitions and empirical indicators. Nannestad (Nannestad 2008: 
416) argues that there are many different understandings of the term social capital, and putting 
them all into the same bag does not tell much about the merits of one theoretical concept over 
another. I have discussed different understandings of social capital in chapter 2, concluding 
that general trust is the main indicator of the concept in quantitative studies. I do agree with 
Nannestad on the importance of knowing exactly what you intend to measure
19
. However I do 
not think this consciousness conflicts with using a general trust indicator, a view which is well 
defended in the literature. I follow the work of quite a wide range of scholars (Cox 2009; 
Fukuyama 1996; Knack and Keefer 1997; Putnam 2001; Van Oorschot 2005; Zak and Knack 
                                                 
19
 Generalized trust is an exact and concrete measurement. In this context this is preferable to an index 
established by different kinds of trust which almost always will be less specified. Using an additive index 
inhibits the exact interpretation of which indicator explains what of the variation in economic growth.  
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2001; Bjørnskov 2006a) – measuring general trust with the survey question “In general, do 
you trust other people or can you never be too careful?” In Latinobarómetro and World Value 
Survey this is a dichotomy, where 2 is no trust and 1 is full trust. I use the aggregated mean of 
all years available with trust data, and supplement with data from the World Value Survey in 
some countries poorly covered by Latinobarómetro
20
.  
 
There is a validity problem with the generalized trust question asked in Latinobarómetro. This 
validity problem is typical for any survey: The room for personal interpretation and different 
understanding of a question. Given that A trusts B concerning a specific issue X, the question 
does not give room to the replier for specifying those relations, consequently, it is up to each 
replier defining B and X, and the variation in interpretation among the sample may exist 
(Nannestad 2008: 416-417). This challenges the possibility for comparison. Furthermore, 
almost nobody trusts nobody or everybody. With a dichotomy where 1 indicates high trust 
and 2 low trust, it is difficult for the interviewee to answer this question in a nuanced way. 
Hence the chance for randomness and limited reflection in the replies increases (Ringdal 
2001). Nonetheless, the question is usually found to be a good indicator of what is intended to 
be measured at an aggregate level, since national social trust scores have proved to be a fairly 
valid measure of honesty, trust and trustworthiness (Uslaner 2004: 12; Bjørnskov 2006a: 9). 
Moreover, Knack shows that the scores on this question correlate with the share of wallets 
returned in the experiment of wallet drop arranged in big cities around the world (Knack and 
Keefer 1997). Cox, Ostrom, Coleman et al. also conclude that this measurement of trust is 
appropriate when the experiment is of an economically relevant size, in this case on the 
aggregate country level (Cox 2009).  
3.6.2 Economic development 
The growth rate of each country, which is the yearly change in percent of GDP, is the measure 
of economic development applied here. This is a traditional and acknowledged approach to 
development. I use the mean growth from 1996 to 2007 in order to achieve more robustness. 
The data is from The World Bank, a much used data source which covers a wide range of 
variables, years and countries. Growth rates of values are computed from constant price series, 
and rates of change from one period to the next are calculated as proportional changes from 
the earlier period (The World Bank 2009).  
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 The mix of data from those sources has been done by for example Bjørnskov (2002, 2009). As the scale and 
question are identical, there is no problem comparing the two.  
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Many small contributions are necessary for an increase in GDP of a country. The macro 
economy of Uruguay rests on decisions and attitudes of a lot of single individuals, running 
large or small firms, and/or negotiation on behalf of them. Economic output is thus not only 
the growth in GDP of a country, but all the small pieces that contribute to this growth. In the 
qualitative analysis economic development is operationalized as any output or gain that is 
fruitful for a company, which directly or indirectly contribute to growth in GDP. Such a broad 
empirical definition is appropriate because it captures more variation and organizes a big 
amount of data (Andersen 1997: 70). 
3.6.3 Control variables 
In order to avoid an omitted variable bias, the inclusion of all relevant variables in the analysis 
is an important assumption to be met in regression analyses (King et al. 1994). Thus, in order 
to investigate the effect of trust on economic growth, it is necessary to control for other 
possible effects on growth, since trust is expected to have a rather small effect.  
 
When investigating literature that uses growth as dependent variable, I find diverging 
practices. There seems to be no theoretical consensus on which, or how many, variables 
should be kept constant while conducting statistical investigations on relationships between 
growth and other variables (Levine 1992). Some state that over 50 variables have been found 
significantly correlated with growth (Levine 1992), while others uphold parsimony as the primary 
concern, allowing few explanatory variables (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Achen 1982). I intend 
to take care of validity and parsimony, as well as theoretical considerations of expected effects. 
However, as my analysis is only based on 19 countries (units), the inclusion of many variables 
would drastically reduce the number of degrees of freedom (Perotti 1996: 12-13) 
21
. I hence 
use the four most conventional variables that are proven to affect economic growth: 
Population growth, investment share of GDP, human capital and level of income of a country 
(Ramey and Ramey 1995).   
Population growth is expected to have a positive effect on economic growth (Barro 1997; 
Levine 1992; Ramey and Ramey 1995). Operationalized, it is the rate of growth in the 
population in the Latin American countries, over a given period. The variable in my analysis 
is the mean of annual population growth from 1996 to 2007. Population numbers in the World 
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 The degrees of freedom refer to the relation between the number of variables and the number of units (Skog 
2004).  
 46 
Bank data are either current census data or historical census data extrapolated through certain 
demographic models.  
Investments share of GDP is operationalized as the level of the investment share of GDP per 
capita. This variable is expected to have a positive impact on growth. Borenstein (1998) argues 
that investment is an important vehicle for the transfer of technology, while many promote it 
simply as an engine for psychical and human capital, which in turn affects growth positively 
(Aghion et al. 1999; Berkowitz 2003; Coatsworth 2008; King 1993; Loayza 2005; Solimano 
2005; Solow 1994; Todaro 2000).  
 
Human capital is included in the analysis on the basis of the presumption that an educated 
labour force is better at creating, implementing, and adopting new technologies, thereby 
generating growth (Romer 1990; Knack and Keefer 1997). Differences in human capital 
should thus affect the growth rate of a country (Benhabib 1994).  Human capital is measured 
by secondary school enrolment in the population. 
 
Level of Gross Domestic Product is the last control variable included in the analysis. It is 
identified by Ross Levine and David Renelt as one of the important control variables for 
cross-country growth equations (Levine 1992; Ramey and Ramey 1995). It refers to the mean 
of the market value of all goods and services made within the borders of a country between 
1997 and 2007 (The world bank, wdi online  2007). 
3.6.4 Social trust in Uruguay  
The definition of a concept should be more inclusive, or “thicker”, in a qualitative analysis 
since the purpose of the qualitative analysis is to get a broader and more complete picture of a 
phenomenon (Geertz 1973). Hence, social capital refers to sources of and indicators of 
generalized trust as showed in figure 3.2. The inclusion of sources is done because trust in 
many cases is hidden and implicit in actions or attitudes that create trust. An example is a 
network or a group that works together. This network has a positive effect on their ability to 
negotiate with each other because they have developed a general trust towards each other. 
Hence it is not the group that directly creates this positive environment; it is the trust 
stemming from being in a group.  
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Functional institutions can also be trust-generating. The presence of a judicial system which 
people can rely on has a positive effect: You do not trust a person (or an agency) to do 
something merely because he says he will do it: you trust him because you know the 
consequences and sanctions of his possible dishonesty (Dasgupta 2000: 51). Indicators of 
trust thus refer to groups, networks, institutions or other trust-generating elements. 
Consequently, in operationalizing social capital, I follow the main approaches of Putnam, who 
emphasizes the creation of trust at community level enhanced by networks and group 
activities, and Rothstein, who sees trust as a product of institutions and policy (Putnam 1993, 
1995; Rothstein and Stolle 2008). In table 3.2 I also briefly present my understanding of the 
transfer mechanisms.  
 
Table 3.2 Operationalization for qualitative analysis 
Variable    Operationalization 
Social capital Trust and the sources of trust, which are networks and 
institutions.  
 
 
Economic output Economic output refers to any economic gain both for 
the single company and for the macro economy of 
Uruguay.  
 
Transfer mechanism  Operationalization  
 
Transaction costs Transaction refers to an agreement carried out between 
two or more persons, exchanging goods, services or other 
items of value. The costs of transactions are thus the 
costs of participating in this exchange/ agreement.  
 
Labour productivity Labour productivity is the amount of goods and services 
that a labourer produces during a given period of time 
(The world bank, wdi online  2007).  It can refer to not 
only a person, but also a firm or a country.  
 
 
Investment Investment is a choice made by an individual or a firm to 
place (or borrow) capital in a product or other element of 
value (O'Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003). 
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3.6.5 Measurement validity and reliability  
Validity refers to the accordance between what a person intends to measure and what he 
actually measures (King et al. 1994; Sartori 1970; Silverman 2006). Does my measurement of 
social capital fit the theoretical description of the concept? This is a major concern in social 
science, and particularly with a concept like social capital. To deal with this challenge, I have 
looked thoroughly at the social capital theory, with special emphasis on the methodological 
considerations – how has former research measured social capital? I also asked the interview 
objects several questions regarding different kinds of trust, in order to see if there is consensus 
among the interviewees.   
 
Validity is of concern both in a qualitative as well as in a quantitative analysis. Adcock and 
Collier underline the many advantages of establishing shared standards of validity for 
quantitative and qualitative scholars. Substantial progress can be made in formulating shared 
standards for assessing measurement validity as the consciousness around validity in the two 
disciplines are closely connected (Adcock 2001: 529). I will thus treat the validity of both the 
qualitative and quantitative measurement together. The measurement of social capital poses 
the greatest validity challenge of this thesis. By measurement validity I do not mean the 
theoretical discussion of what social capital really is. Rather, it relates to the consistency 
between the concept and the empirical observations of social capital.  
 
Trust is a person’s subjective feeling and hence almost impossible to compare interpersonally. 
It is also culturally dependent, which makes it difficult to make comparisons between 
countries. Including countries from a big and diverse continent as Latin America in the 
analysis thus creates problems for measuring variables in a consistent way across countries. The 
fact that several of these countries are developing and poor countries makes the possibility of 
measurement error even bigger (Barro 2000: 11). Moreover, as a personal and value- oriented 
element, trust can easily be influenced by surroundings known or unknown to the data 
collector, as well as the current situation of the respondent or the interviewer. However, as I 
have already discussed in the measurement section, this is always a concern with survey data, 
and does not mean that one should stop measuring complex and subjective concepts, as there 
are tools available for facing these challenges.  
 
First of all, to compare different sources and measurements in the existing literature in the 
field is crucial. There are numerous studies on the link between economic pay-offs and social 
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capital. Having read a wide range of literature on operationalization of social capital, I have 
found that it is a common and well-tested practice to use the general trust indicator for 
measuring trust. Secondly, familiarity with the case of Uruguay and the theory is another way 
of facing the challenge of trust. Going to Uruguay and get access to relevant reports etc on the 
topic contributes to familiarize with the case. And thirdly overlapping with the second point, I 
use interviews to acquire further knowledge on the issue and to ensure that my understanding 
corresponds to theirs. The interview subjects answered several questions regarding trust on 
different levels and consequently contributed to a broader picture.  
 
Nonetheless, I emphasize carefulness in balancing the interpretation of the statements of the 
interview objects, not over- or underestimating the meaning of them (King et al. 1994). This 
is important as I do not wish to stretch the concept of social capital. Sartori stresses that 
concepts do not necessarily travel well. Applying the concept of trust in a “new” continent 
involves the risk of stretching it, at the risk of loosing intensity and distinctness (Sartori 1970). 
“New” because the theoretical framework of trust was developed based on empirical studies 
in Italy and later in USA. Nevertheless, I have already stressed the importance of using trust 
as an explanatory variable of economic output also in Latin America as well. Moreover, the 
risk of conceptual stretching is diminished by conducting a case study since closeness to the 
case helps me to define and observe the phenomenon with accuracy.  
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4 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
 
In this chapter, I will report my empirical findings and comment on them in the light of the 
hypothesis drawn in section 2.4.1 from social capital theory: Social capital has a positive 
effect on level of economic development in Latin America. I will first briefly present 
descriptive statistics on the variables included, before I comment on the results and the 
regression model and its implications.  
4.1 Preliminary quantitative analysis 
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
    N Mean  Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Growth    19 3.8  1  1.9  5.9 
Social trust   19 17.4  5.6  5.8  27.3 
Population growth  19 1.5  .50  .30  2.4 
Level of GDP PPP  18 6862.2  2920.2  2144.4  11906.5 
Investment share   19 20.1  5.9  10.9  32.4 
Human capital   18 73.8  15.3  44.2  104.1 
Total    19   
 
 
My dataset includes 19 countries. Level of GDP PPP per capita and Human capital lack one 
observation, which is Puerto Rico. This is due to the calculation of purchasing power parity 
(PPP). An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GDP as a U.S. dollar has 
in the United States. However, the rankings of The World Bank include only those economies 
with confirmed PPP GDP estimates, which Puerto Rico does not have (The world bank, wdi 
online  2007).  
 
The standard deviation for the dependent variable Growth is 1 and the mean is 2.8 between a 
maximum level of 5.92 and a minimum level of 1.93. This indicates a normal distribution. It 
is crucial for the regression analysis that Growth is normally distributed as it is the dependent 
variable in the analysis (Pennings 2006). The mean level of growth between 1996 and 2007 is 
highest in the Dominican Republic, while the minimum value held by Paraguay. In spite of 
the apparently normal distribution of growth, I ran a DFbeta analysis to check for influential 
cases. The DFbeta analysis determines that the Dominican Republic is almost on the limit of 
being characterized as too influential (Long and Freese 2006). However, I do not exclude it 
from the analysis. As my analysis is based on few units, I prefer not limiting the analysis´ 
coverage (Hair et al. 2006: 76). The standard deviation is defined as the squared root of the 
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variance, referring to the diffusion of units. More precisely it is the mean deviation from the 
mean. The standard deviations of the control variables are all acceptable, as well as the 
DFbeta analysis. 
 
The mean of 17.4 in Social trust indicates that there is a big majority who believes that most 
people can NOT be trusted. The original question is a dichotomy; hence the aggregated values 
show the answers on the trust-category in percent: 17.4 percent as the mean percent of the 
trusting people on the continent. Brazil, with 5.77 is the least trusting country, and in Uruguay, 
which holds the maximum value, 27.3 of the population trust other people. Nonetheless it is 
not very high. Evidently, no country in Latin America has an over-abundance of trusting 
people. In the case of social trust, the standard deviation is 5.6 while the mean is 17.4, which 
indicates a normal distribution.  
4.2 Bivariate analysis  
The Pearson correlation between Population growth and level of GDP PPP per capita is -.515, 
significant at a 5 percent level. This is not surprising, as growth in the population of 
developing countries will affect the amount of gross domestic product divided on this same 
population (Coale 1958; Mankiw et al. 1992: 407). Human capital also correlates at .68 with 
population growth. A high correlation implicates difficulty in distinguishing their explanatory 
power on variation in the dependent variable.  As a consequence, their joint influence will be 
less than the sum of their separate influence on the dependent variable. The Persons R of .68 
and -.515 is not very high, but  I will keep a careful eye on the tolerance values in the multiple 
regression analysis (Hair et al. 2006: 230).  
 
The unstandardized coefficient of a bivariate regression of the effect of social trust on growth 
shows that if social trust increases by one unit, growth increases by .58 units, which is 
significant at a 17 % level when no control variables are included. A small sample enables a 
more liberal significance threshold, as is 17 % (Hair et al. 2006; Morrison 2006). However, as 
my sample equals the population, the significance level is of less importance.  
 
Table 4.2 Bivariate regression analysis 
   B  St Error  Beta  P-value  
Constant  2.76  .74    .002   
Social trust  .58  .04  .33  .17 
N: 19                                   Dependent variable: growth   Adjusted R square: .055 
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4.3 Multivariate regression analysis 
Table 4.3 Model 1 
   B  St Error  Beta  P-value  Tolerance 
Constant  -1.88  2.41    .446   
Population growth .68  .57  .33  .249  .496 
Level of GDP PPP 6.90E-005 .00  .197  .419  .668 
Investment share  0,123  .04  .73  .005  .816 
Human capital  .02  .20  .32  .297  .419 
Total    
N: 18  R2: .515  Adjusted R2: .366 
 
Table 4.4 Model II 
   B  St Error  Beta  P-value  Tolerance 
Constant  -5.73  2.46    .038   
Social trust  .09  .03  .497  .021  .729 
Population growth 1.33  .53  .64  .027  .392 
Level of GDP PPP 4.51E-005 .00  .13  .524  .657 
Investment share  0,119  .03  .71  .002  .814  
Human capital  .04  .02  .64  .038  .342  
Total    
N: 18  R2: .695  Adjusted R2: .568 
 
 
Model I, table 4.3, contains only the control variables for the model, while social trust is 
included in model II, table 4.4. This is done to consider the possible change in the explanatory 
power of the model when including social trust. The adjusted R square increases from .366 
to .568 when including the explanatory variable. The adjusted R square of .568 indicates that 
predictions of the values of individual cases on the basis of the regression model is quite high, 
as .568 is considered as an high explanatory effect in social science, and even more when 
conducting research with survey data. All variables but one are not significant in model 1, but 
turn significant when including trust in the model, except level of GDP PPP. This could also 
have an effect on the adjusted R squared. The increase in the adjusted R squared in model II, 
together with the results of the bivariate regression, gives support to the general hypothesis of 
the thesis: Social capital promotes economic development.  
 
The sample size of this research should be subjected to special considerations, as it is one of 
the most influential elements in a regression analysis concerning the strength and 
generalizability of results (Hair et al. 2006: 194-195). With a sample of only 19 units, which 
equals the small population, the inclusion of control variables should be done with caution to 
prevent too few degrees of freedom. Including 5 variables in a model with 19 units means 
decreasing the power of the analysis (Hair et al. 2006). Also, by having too few degrees of 
freedom, I risk making the model too specific to the precise sample. However, there is a kind 
of trade-off between the theoretical and methodological considerations. At the expense of 
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parsimony and sufficient degrees of freedom, comes the theoretical assumption that other 
variables are needed when analysing causes of variation in economic growth. As social trust is 
expected to have a modest influence on growth, the model should include crucial control 
variables peeling of some effects. Being aware of the limited possibility of generalization and 
power of the model (Selvin 1957), I still argue that important tendencies can be read out of 
the results. Furthermore, social trust is shown to have an effect on the level of growth that is 
significant at a 17 % level when no other variables are included.  
 
Tolerance is a measure of collinearity. Hair et al (2006: 230) mentions .1 as a liberal tolerance 
threshold, but argues that an absolute number of an acceptable tolerance value is problematic, 
as it will always be a matter of degree of collinearity, dependent on sample and other 
considerations. I operate with a .3 limit, which is quite strict. All the variables included 
exceed this level. 
 
All the variables except Level of GDP PPP are significant at a 5 percent level. They have 
positive substantial effects, which is according to the theoretical expectations. This means that 
an increase in investment share of GDP, human capital (education), and population have a 
positive effect on growth. I will not further comment on the effects of the control variables 
here because the effect of social capital on economic growth is the main focus on this thesis. 
The level of the control variables is however relevant in explaining the low growth level in 
Uruguay which I will comment on in the next section. Ultimately, and most important, social 
trust has a positive significant effect on economic growth. The unstandarized coefficient for 
social trust is .09, which means that one unit increase in trust gives .09 unit increase in growth. 
This strengthens the general hypothesis: Social capital has a positive effect on the variation in 
economic development in Latin America. This justifies a qualitative study of how this 
relationship holds.  
4.4 Why low growth in Uruguay? 
In section 3.4 I pointed at Uruguay having comparatively low economic growth, theoretically 
unexpected given the level of trust. Does the comparatively low economic growth in Uruguay 
indicate a weakening of the theoretical expectation of trust as growth-promoting? I argue that 
it does not.  Since some of the control variables in the analysis are expected to influence 
growth, and to a greater extent than trust, it is relevant to take a closer look at their level in 
order to explain the comparatively low growth rate.  
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First, Uruguay, followed by Puerto Rico, has by far the lowest population growth of the Latin 
American counties included in the sample, with a mean of .27 percent per year from 1996 to 
2007, visualized in figure 4.1. As mentioned, population growth is expected to influence the 
economy positively, and can thus be one explanation for the comparatively low mean growth 
of 2.63 percent in Uruguay. The regression analysis of the Latin American countries showed 
that population growth had a significant positive effect on growth.  
Figure 4.1 Population growth 1996-2007 
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Furthermore, figure 4.2 shows that the investment share of GDP is also comparatively low in 
Uruguay. Only Bolivia has a lower investment share of GDP among the sample. Investment is 
a necessary vehicle for the technology development, which is crucial for the economy to grow 
(Borensztein 1998). This variable also had a significant strong positive effect on growth in the 
quantitative analysis.  
Figure 4.2 Investment share 1996-2007 
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The level of GDP in Uruguay is not comparatively low. On a scale from 11082 in Chile to 
2144 in Nicaragua, the mean level of GDP in Uruguay between 1996 and 2007 is 8924.5. 
Uruguay thus seems to be quite well off, in spite of the low growth during the last ten years. 
There is not a consensus in the economic theory whether level of GDP has a positive or 
negative effect on growth. The convergence theory explains low growth exactly by the 
richness of countries; if they have a high GDP they grow more slowly, however, it is 
criticized for not gathering much empirical support (Romer 1996).  
Figure 4.3 Level of GDP (PPP) 1996-2007 
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Human capital on the other hand seems to run the growth engine together with social capital 
in Uruguay. Next to Brazil, Uruguay has the highest social capital in the sample. As 
underlined by some of my interview subjects, Uruguay has a skilled labour force which 
attracts foreign investment (Bartesaghi 2009).   
Figure 4.4 Level of Human Capital 1996-2007 
Human capital
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The purpose of this discussion is to highlight that Uruguay is a relevant case for investigation. 
Intuitively, the high trust level and the low growth rates can give the impression that the 
transfer mechanisms do not work as they are expected to. Instead, according to the tables 
above, it seems that the control variables explain the comparatively low growth. As such, 
taking the effect of the control variables into account, Uruguay still stands out in the sample, 
but not as a case where the mechanisms of trust necessarily not give economic outputs. The 
pertinent dimension of this thesis is affected by the significant effect of other variables. As 
George and Bennett (2005: 122-123) state, many contextual factors must be taken into 
account. 
4.5 Concluding the analysis 
The significant positive effect of social trust on growth supports the overall hypothesis and 
research question of this thesis: Social trust is good for economic development in Latin 
America. This strengthens the theoretical claim that trust is an economic promoter and 
producer of a societal good (Putnam 1993, 2000; Rothstein and Stolle 2008; Rothstein 2005).  
 
The empirical support for a general relation between social trust and economic growth 
justifies the case study of Uruguay for investigating how the mechanisms behind this 
relationship work. With the highest trust level in the sample, it is suitable for tracking the 
impact of trust. The analysis also shows that the control variables seem to explain the 
comparatively low economic growth in Uruguay. Overall, the tendencies concerning trust 
revealed statistically will be traced using first hand data from interviews in Uruguay and 
hence contribute to a more robust analysis.  
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5 QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS 
 
Although “gathering hard data is indispensable, the qualitative aspects of social capital should 
not be neglected. In many respects, it is something of a contradiction to argue that universal 
measures can be used to capture local idiosyncratic realities”(Woolcock 2001: 79). I have  
carried out a qualitative analysis, and preserved the local complexity and characteristics of the 
concept following Woolcock, tracing the processes of transmission between trust and 
economic gains based on first hand data from qualitative interviews that I conducted in 
Uruguay. According to the statistical analysis, trust is highly present in Uruguay, and the 
comparatively low economic growth seems to be mainly explained by low values on 
influential control variables. I aim to see how individuals shed light on why and if these 
mechanisms are functioning in the way they are theoretically supposed to do. As presented in 
section 3.5.2, the interviews were conducted with representatives from seven large firms in 
Uruguay and two interest organizations; the Chamber of Commerce and Service, and the 
Chamber of Industry.   
 
The analysis chapter is organized according to the three hypotheses elaborated in the theory 
chapter: The effects of trust on transaction costs, investment and labour productivity. While 
all forms for social capital are essential for development, none of them are sufficient in and of 
themselves (Ostrom 2000: 172). Therefore, throughout the analysis intervening variables on 
the relationship between trust and economic output, such as the size of Uruguay, will be dealt 
with.  
5.1 Trust lowers transaction costs 
The theoretical expectation of this section is that trust leads to economic benefits through the 
lowering of transaction costs (Collier 1999). On the basis of the theoretical discussion, I 
initiated the interviews with the expectation that certain patterns of behaviours would result 
from trust. My first assumption was that the smoothness of contract-making can lower the 
costs of transaction. Less time spent and less documentation and bureaucracy needed means 
economic gain for the company.  
 
Secondly, transactions will take place more frequently with the presence of trust. According 
to Luhmann (Luhmann 1979), trust is a risk-reducing factor and it thus could make society 
more stable and predictable, which would ease transactions and enable firms to undertake 
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longer-term commitments. Trusting the surroundings makes the road to contracts shorter. I 
also study how this road could be too short, ending in informal economic activity.  In other 
words, a close business network where the participants trust each other could as a 
consequence make them skip the formal contracts and move into informal economic activity. 
Ultimately, I will comment on corruption in relation to trust and transactions.  
5.1.1 The advantage of trust for large firms 
I divide the advantages of trust in lowering transaction costs according to the size of the 
companies, as tendencies from the data reveal that this matters.  
 
Ana Laura Fernandez represents the National Chamber of Commerce. She states that the 
Chamber senses a culture of trust and knowing each other among the business people in 
Uruguay (Fernandez 2009; Bjørnskov 2006a: 7). This is mainly because Uruguay is a small 
country where “everybody knows everybody”, which almost promotes a kind of forced trust 
environment (Fernandez 2009). She does not reply affirmatively when I ask if it lowers the 
use of written contracts. As unwritten contracts have a negative connotation and might be 
associated with corruption, it would be rather radical to admit such a thing. Also, I suppose it 
is not very likely that firm leaders would give information about informal contract-making to 
The Chamber of Commerce. Instead, Fernandez describes the trusting culture as a form of 
control mechanism for the contrary. It is difficult to cheat or play unfairly, since the network 
of firms is so transparent due to the small size, and the fact that firms are inclined to follow 
formal rules. Accordingly, her statements lead to the conclusion that networking and trust 
among big firms do not lower transaction costs in terms of resulting in informal business 
arrangements. This is supported by the fact that none of the seven firm leaders said they had 
made transactions with unwritten contracts.  
 
However, the ease of contract-making highlighted by Zak and Knack (2001) does not 
necessarily mean skipping formal contracts. The financial director of Conaprole
22
, Jose Rial, 
expressed explicitly that he is more likely to make contracts with people he knows than with 
people he does not know, given that the conditions of the agreement are not favourable with 
the unknown person (Rial 2009): 
 
                                                 
22
 Conaprole is the national cooperation of milk producers, which historically has been the main exporter of 
products in the Uruguayan economy. Today it is a leading dairy producer for Uruguay and the neighbour 
countries.  
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“If I have two economically similar offers, and I know one of the persons better than the other, 
I surely end up making the contract with that person. I prefer to concretise with whom I know, 
who I am sure has a good reputation, has satisfied others with his contracts, and with whom I 
am closer” (Rial 2009)
 23
.  
 
It is thus not the lack of contracts, but the road towards the contracts that is promoted by 
networks and trust: He uses less time on formal negotiations. Consequently, it pays off for 
Rial to have a network because it saves time and thus lowers transaction costs early in the 
deal-making process, but not at the contract stage. Furthermore, given that you have reasons 
for trusting those with whom you are conducting business, there will be less questions and 
requirements for documentation in order to conduct the transaction. Fuscaldo highlights that 
this is important for him when doing business: 
 
“My experience is, that in Uruguay, no one even thinks about requiring a balance sheet when 
transacting, and if someone asks for it, you just turn your back and leave the room. The 
transaction in the commercial sector thus functions much more fluidly than the transaction in 
e.g. a bank which has to follow the procedures” (Fuscaldo 2009).  
 
As such, these tendencies in the data support the theoretical expectation of contract making 
being easier with the presence of trust. In relation to Zack and Knack’s experiment on the 
consumers trust in brokers mentioned in the theory section (Zak and Knack 2001: 296-297), 
the researched Uruguayan business environment seems to function in a similar way. There is 
an informal agreement that you do not require bank balances, as Fuscaldo said. As the 
environment is small, you still have a form of control as the reputational sanction possibility 
is present.  
 
A second expectation drawn from the theory is that personal connections or former experience 
with possible partners promote a trust experience that will ease transactions (Bjørnskov 
2006a). As Uruguay is small, networks are established easily, which creates trust. The general 
director of the main bus terminal and shopping centre in Uruguay, Marcelo Lombardi, 
explicitly states that:   
 
“The network of relations contributes to the ease of making deals” (Lombardi 2009).                                                    
                                                 
23
 All quotations are translated from Spanish by the author. The original transcriptions in Spanish are available 
on request.  
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 He explains this by the size of the business community. You always have a friend or a friend 
of a friend who can help you find the trustworthy partner, and thus save time and resources 
you would have spent if you had to do this formally. Also, he states that access to the desk of 
whoever is possible.  
 
“If you need to talk to an important politician that is normally not a problem” (Lombardi 
2009).  
 
The fact that the director of a big firm states this highlights the easy access to bureaucrats and 
state institutions. My interviewees would probably never admit that they have excessively 
close relationships with representatives from control organs, and neither did I ask if they had. 
The information given by Lombardi indicates that first of all, it is absolutely possible to have 
close relations with bureaucrats, and secondly, this possibility is widely known and accepted.  
Easy access to persons with high positions is supported by my experience as an interviewer. 
Data collection for this thesis was made possible thanks to business directors in Uruguay 
being so easily available for me. The snowball sampling method functioned well, as it tends to 
do if the relevant group of people knows each other (Grønmo 2004).  
 
Networking as a creator of trust is present in Uruguay, whether it is forced by the 
transparency because of the small size or not. The data show that trust lowers transaction 
costs by facilitating business, and by facilitating the creation of a possible channel of 
influence toward politicians.  
 
Still another function from the second expectation that personal connections will promote 
transactions (Bjørnskov 2006a), which I trace in my first-hand data, is the facilitation of the 
creation of a firm. Nicolas Jodal is the director and also the founder of Artech, the largest 
software firm in Uruguay. He highlights that the establishment of a new business is eased by 
networks of contacts. 
 
“Although you would always confront obstacles, such as a big bureaucracy, high taxes, and 
extensive regulation when establishing a new business, the network to some extent eases 
those processes” (Jodal 2009).   
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Jodal did not elaborate on this statement, and thus did not specify which processes had gone 
more smoothly. Nevertheless, it is easier to deal with the bureaucracy concerning permissions 
and rules if you know the bureaucrat. As Lombardi openly claimed:  
 
“Getting on to anybody’s desk is easy in Uruguay” (Lombardi 2009).  
 
The size of the country explains the close networks that my sources were part of, and size can 
even be an explanation for easy transactions. However, it does not change the theoretically 
expected causal order: The size of the country creates business communities, which in turn 
contribute to explain the amount of trust. Thus, trust is the proximate explanation of why it is 
possible and preferable to make contracts with already known people, and/or why it is not 
possible to play unfairly within a given community.   
5.1.2 Trust and informalism for small firms 
The discussion so far has focused on the experiences of large firms in Uruguay. However, 
much of the Uruguayan economy is based on the economic activity of very small companies, 
and trust plays a different role for them (Fernandez 2009). The experience from these small 
firms also seem relevant for highlighting the third theoretical assumption for transactions 
costs being reduced with trust: That the informal business, such as markets, is promoted by 
trust.  
 
 The representative of the national Chamber of Industry, Ignacio Bartesaghi, largely agrees 
with Fernandez, Lombardi and Rial on trust playing a controlling role as mentioned in 
previous section, but goes on to indicate that not all economic actors share that experience: 
 
“I don’t think the degree of informalism regarding contracts is very high. I don’t consider 
that as likely. But yes, in many small firms they base their informal economic activity on 
the contacts they have, although that does not happen in the well established and serious 
firms”  (Bartesaghi 2009).  
 
I argued in section 2.4.2 that trust is needed in informal business for two reasons. It is first of 
all needed between the transacting parts because informal business has no formal price 
regulations or a priori security of quality (Kollock 1994). Secondly, the consumer trusts the 
mechanisms of social punishment if the quality of the products appears to fail. Is this reflected 
in the empirical data? 
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The big, established and well known firms that have a broad public reputation to take care of 
seem to follow the formal transaction rules. The small and trusting environment is, as 
mentioned, an incentive for this. However, small and often family-driven enterprises with 
around 2-10 employees are numerous in Uruguay and more resource-consuming for the 
government to control (Hodara 2009; Fuscaldo 2009; Fernandez 2009; Bartesaghi 2009).  
 
The reality among these kinds of companies can thus be quite different. Informal networks in 
the commercial sector are frequent and well functioning, but operate for some firms to an 
exaggerated extent. By using the word exaggerated, I refer to informal networks producing an 
informal economy: the informalism in Uruguay counts 33.3 percent of the total economy, 
according to the report “La informalidad en Uruguay: Diagnosis y propuestas” (Brasca et al. 
2009)
 24
. This number refers to the firms running all their total economic activity outside the 
formal frame. Firms may also carry out informal acts although their main activity is registered 
and within formal frames.  
 
The report, and also secondary literature in this field, point to taxation and regulation policies 
and the unemployment quota as the main forces driving a shadow economy (Schneider 
2007b). The size of government spending and the lack of incentives from the government are 
also connected explanations (Fernandez 2009; Hodara 2009; Fuscaldo 2009; Brasca et al. 
2009; Schneider 2007b). In addition, Fernandez highlights the strict rules concerning for 
example indexes of content and packaging implemented by the current government. 
 
“Another element that heavily influences the firm owner is one regulation after the other 
from the government. These are obstacles that end up increasing the price of the activity. 
For example the importation of toys, which causes a lot of work concerning tags after 
importation” (Fernandez 2009).  
 
This falls into the long list of other bumps in the road that a manager needs to deal with, and 
which “makes life impossible” for them (Fernandez 2009). However, Johnson, Kaufman and 
Zoido-Lobatón (1998) find that the unofficial economy accounts for a larger share of GDP 
                                                 
24
 In a comparative Latin American perspective, Uruguay does not suffer from a disproportionate high level of 
informality (Schneider 2007a: 25). 
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when there is more corruption and trust in the rule of law is weaker. In accordance with this 
argument, I find that trust has a role to play in enabling the unofficial economy.  
 
This trust mechanism that enables informalism stands in contrast to the mechanism that 
prevents the informalism mentioned earlier, making the environment transparent and easy to 
control. Jodal emphasizes that informalism is common at one stage in a firm’s development, 
based on the contacts in your surroundings (Jodal 2009): 
 
“I think there is a strong correlation between the size of the company and the degree of 
informalism. Practically all Uruguayan firms start with a high level of informality. You 
don’t have anything written when you start, and you don’t follow the rules, because you 
always have a friend or a contact” (Jodal 2009).  
 
It might seem that I, in formulating the hypotheses, have overstated the importance of trust in 
explaining informality. In many cases people go to informal markets because they simply do 
not know the formal rules yet or need to lower the cost of living, regardless of trust (Lombardi 
2009). Seeing no other choice, they start selling and working outside the legal market. Also, 
according to Olson they get a too small advantage from contributing to the collective good 
(Olson 1971: 35): “The larger [companies] bear a disproportionate share of the burden of 
providing the collective good. The smaller [companies] by definition get a smaller fraction of 
benefit of any amount of the collective good they provide than a larger member, and therefore 
have less incentives to provide additional amounts of collective good”. Still, trust enables 
such activity.  
 
However, although this point highlights that there is hardly ever trust instead of other 
elements or trust alone that can explain the possibility of lowering transaction costs, trust is a 
contribution, an oiling of the machinery, an X-factor that enables the already existing 
possibilities. Hence, it is in accordance with the social capital theory which claims that trust 
plays a role in decreasing transaction costs. First of all as a control mechanism for visible 
firms playing their game well and preserving their good reputation, and secondly, in the 
informal production activities, making the distribution of products with no formal guarantee 
possible.  
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5.1.3 Benign informalism?  
Given that trust plays a somewhat positive role in the functioning of the informal economy, is 
it indirectly damaging for the macro economy of Uruguay? Dell´Anno (2008) states that the 
informal economy is considered beneficial for sustaining economic growth because the 
unofficial economy competes with the formal economy and forces efficiency (Dell´Anno 
2008). A certain positive influence of the informal economy on the efficient functioning and 
development of the official economy thus cannot be denied (Schneider 2007b). Also, it will 
lower the de facto unemployment rate. In the absence of formal work, many seek to make 
their living inside the informal economic sphere.  
 
None of my interview subjects mentioned any positive effects that the informal economy may 
have, which is understandable and somewhat obvious since they all work within the official 
economy.  They focus on informality as a problem, mainly caused by the current government 
– probably because they disagree with the current political rulers.   
 
It is necessary to reflect on the background and the agenda of my interview objects. All of 
them, except one, stated explicitly that taxation in Uruguay is too high and constitutes a 
negative incentive to the business culture in the country and for the country as a whole. The 
tax level was an issue that was used as an explanation of many evils in society, and seen as an 
important cause for corruption, informalism and a poor investment culture. As such, the effect 
of networking or knowing each other (too) well was totally overshadowed by the focus on 
shortcomings in the tax policies of the current government. When interpreting these 
statements, it is relevant to bear in mind that there were, as mentioned in the methodology 
chapter, presidential elections two months after I conducted the interviews, and that Uruguay 
then had a leftist government
25
. Even though they all knew that I was not qualified to vote in 
Uruguayan elections, I think they still argued from the conservative side of the political 
landscape trying to inform me about their view of the best interests of the country. Fernandez 
was explicit about the opposition position of the Chamber of Commerce, and Lombardi did 
not hide his negative attitudes towards the leftist presidential candidate, Jose Mujica 
(Fernandez 2009; Lombardi 2009).  
                                                 
25
 Tabaré Vasquez was the president of Uruguay for the leftist-wing coalition Frente Amplio until these elections. 
He was the first president from this party in Uruguayan history, and was elected on the 31st of October 2004. On 
the 29
th
 of November José Mujica was elected the new president of Uruguay after a second round. He represents 
the same party. Mujica won against the opposition leader Luis Alberto Lacalle.  
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5.1.4 Trust and Corruption 
“People who have faith in others are more likely to endorse strong standards of moral and 
legal behaviour” (Uslaner 2002: 2).  
 
The last assumption explained in section 2.4.2 regarding hypothesis 1: trust lowers transaction 
costs, is that trust between a principal and an agent is fundamental to avoid corruption, 
including in transactions (Bjørnskov 2003; Della Porta 1999). And corruption harms the 
economy, by transferring funds from public purposes to private gain (Uslaner 2004: 5). What 
is the culture within firms in Uruguay with regards to corruption? It is complex and difficult 
through interviews to find out whether an agent acts in the boss´ interest or his own. As 
corruption per se is a negatively loaded concept, one could not expect admittance of corrupt 
actions within a company through identified interviews such as those conducted for this thesis. 
However, the subjective perception of the corruption level in society is crucial for how people 
act, as a principal or as an agent. If the perception of corruption is high, there is a general 
reason for not trusting people, and one can expect a certain level of corruption in almost every 
firm. If, on the other hand, the general opinion is that the corruption level is low, the trust is 
expected to increase correspondingly. Why? Because where there is much corruption, the 
costs of not acting corruptly would be high, while in societies with low corruption a corrupt 
action could be heavily punished, both by law and reputation.  
 
The subjective corruption level in Uruguay is seen as comparatively low according to most of 
my interview subjects, with the majority of them using Argentina as a comparative reference 
and point at that country as an outstanding example of high corruption rates. Fernandez from 
the Commercial Chamber stresses that customs are the biggest problem of corruption 
concerning her Chamber. Letting illegal goods pass in exchange for small bribes is very 
common. However, the government has received a loan from the Inter-American 
Development Bank in order to reform the customs bureau. Furthermore she states:  
 
“I tell you about this kind of corruption because concerning the corruption level within 
the government we are doing well. Uruguay is not a country characterized by corruption. 
It is not like corruption cases always appear. But once in a while you hear about them, 
still it is not common. And when they appear, everybody gets to hear about it” 
(Fernandez 2009).  
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Citations from the responses by Bartesaghi, Muñoz and Jodal highlight the same tendencies: 
 
“There is some corruption, but comparatively we are not bad compared to Argentina for 
example” (Bartesaghi 2009).  
 
“There is corruption, but there is also control. I trust the Uruguayan government more 
than the Argentinean for example” (Muñoz 2009).  
 
“The phenomenon of corruption exists, but you do not by far face it every day. I think 
that the spirit in the business world is good and something that we need to preserve in 
Uruguay. I think the corruption in general exists on a micro level, like avoiding traffic 
fines, but I do not encounter more serious situations” (Jodal 2009).  
 
The level of corruption seems to be perceived as quite low, but probably not only due to the 
level itself, rather due to the cases of comparison they have in mind. In Latin America 
Uruguay seems well off in corruption measures, although they all admit that it exists. As 
mentioned, the subjective perception is what is mapped out here, since it says something 
about the climate of trust. Lombardi sheds light on this: 
 
“A priori [of a business] I trust that I will not have any difficulties of corruption from the 
State in order to realize the business or investment. This is not taken into consideration in 
a single moment of a decision – which illustrates that corruption is not perceived as a 
problem for the business community in Uruguay, like it is in Argentina, in Ecuador, 
surely in Venezuela and also in Brazil” (Lombardi 2009).   
 
Again, the size is a plausible partial explanation of the transparent environment, and the 
division of small and big firms is evident also concerning the frequency of corruption. All my 
respondents know and represent the big business environment. How corruption is perceived in 
other environments within the same country has not been investigated in this thesis.  
 
The role of trust as a mediator for preventing corruption is strengthened by the small size of 
Uruguay. 
5.1.5 Section summary 
Hypothesis 1: trust lowers transaction cost, finds support in the analysis conducted. In large 
firms networks of trust function on the one hand as a control mechanism for following formal 
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rules, on the other hand, they facilitated these formal procedures. Trust minimises risk, and 
spending little time on documentation and risk-minimizing elements when transacting lowers 
costs.  Within the small firms of Uruguay, informal acts and also informal business occur. It is 
challenging to investigate the topic of informalism through interviews, since systemized 
informalism is illegal. However, trust seems to facilitate informalism in the sense that trust 
networks make it possible. As Jodal said: “You don’t follow the rules, because you always 
have a friend or a contact” (Jodal 2009). Trust between a principal and an agent is 
fundamental to avoid corruption. I looked for the perceived corruption level among my 
respondent in order to investigate this mechanism, and in their opinion it did not seem very 
high. The comparatively high level of trust in Uruguay found in the quantitative data from 
Latinobarómetro thus gains some support in the qualitative data and supports hypothesis 1.  
5.2 Trust promotes productivity  
On the basis of the theoretical expectations outlined in section 2.4.2, I tried to map out how 
the existence of trust in the Uruguayan companies could have positive effects on productivity. 
 
The reasons for the worker to produce, and also for sticking with the same company, are 
emphasized. In accordance with the theory (Sako 2006), could I trace that the directors had 
any motivational elements of trust in their tools for promoting productivity? I find that 
incentives for working hard in the investigated firms in Uruguay seem to be connected to trust, 
but not necessarily in the sense of trusting in receiving an extra reward. Rather, trust in the 
safety of maintaining the same employment, in other words, having a job seems crucial for 
productivity to increase. With the financial crisis of 2001/2002 in mind where the 
unemployment rate reached 20 percent, trust in preserving a monthly income appears to be the 
core incentive of the mechanism for the majority.  
5.2.1 No need for rewards?  
One of the main sources of trust is as mentioned networking and grouping together, as trust is 
a network-mediated benefit (Bourdieu 1983).  When describing the Jewish jewellery market 
in Buenos Aires in section 2.6, I emphasized the role of the community network in the 
enclave as crucial for their success. Such a network can also be created in the workplace, 
although not based on the members sharing the same religion or ethnicity. Rather, class 
identities can function in a similar manner. In Marx’s analysis of emergent class 
consciousness in the industrial proletariat, workers learned to identify with each other and 
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support each other’s initiatives (Marx 1998[1894]). This trust-relation was not something 
coming from a culture outside, or from each workers personality, but an emergent product of 
a common fate (Portes 1998). Consequently, there exist some tools for the employer in order 
to lay the grounds for this feeling of fellowship, increasing the trust environment at work and 
consequently the overall productivity. One of those tools can constitute any form of social 
activity outside the regular work activity in the firm, or other activities that can make the 
workers feel part of the same unit.  
 
Among the business leaders in Uruguay there seems to be a lack of awareness of this. In 
Fernandez´ opinion firm leaders are mostly myopic, solving the challenges on a day-to-day 
basis, which contrasts with investing time and resources on non-obligatory activities. Human 
resource philosophy requires the capacity for long-term thinking (Fernandez 2009). 
Bartesaghi strongly agrees and calls human resource policy non-existent in Uruguay, at least 
in the Chambers experience. 
 
“No, no, no. The field of human resources in the companies, or even something 
corresponding, is non-existent. That form of mentality is very rare. In Uruguay we have had 
some cases of companies with a good human resource policy, but they have been influenced 
by multinationals. At the local level we do not have that custom” (Bartesaghi 2009). 
 
The few cases of this kind of conscious thinking about creating a feeling of fellowship at 
work have come from multinational companies, not from Uruguay (Bartesaghi 2009). 
However, these two respondents, who represent the chambers of commerce and industry, are 
far more negative than the firm representatives themselves in this concern. This is not too 
surprising, since the firm representatives want to give a good impression of their company and 
thus show that the well-being of their employees is being taken care of. Also, when asking a 
question where an affirmative answer seems to be the right answer, you can get a kind of 
confirmative bias.  
 
All the firm representatives gave some examples of engagement in their company concerning 
non-work activity. Muñoz from Zenda mentions two football teams within the company, 
although they now, after the global financial crises, play without the economic support of the 
company. The economic support had earlier covered all the costs related to training, even 
contributions to bus tickets in order to get to the practices etc.  
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“We have two football teams. They now play without much economic support. In some 
periods we covered everything for them, even the bus tickets to the practice. Now we have 
a very low social budget” (Muñoz 2009).  
 
The employees of Tres Cruces shopping centre and bus terminal receive a present on their 
birthdays, and their kids also get school-related gifts when school starts each year. Other 
social gatherings like going out for a drink etc are mainly initiated by the workers themselves. 
The director, Lombardi, tried to emphasize the fact that the employees are already so busy 
that he did not want to bother them with more activities after work. In the greatest free trade 
zone in Uruguay, Zonamerica, there are several benefits for the employees in the companies 
within the free zone.  Isidoro Hodara, who is the Director of Zonamerica, highlights family 
days or birthday celebrations as examples. However, factors that are more crucial for the 
working climate at Zonamerica, are simpler and of a more day-to- day character. Nice places 
to have lunch where the boss sits with the other employees, well developed surroundings, and 
promotion of the free trade zone as a good place to work are as well important. 
 
“There is something important in the everyday of the workers: Everybody that visits 
Zonamerica always says “how nice!”, “What a good place to work”. This strengthens the 
spirit of the workers” (Hodara 2009).  
 
Hodara as such shows an understanding of the importance of these factors in order to maintain 
a stable labour force. The fact that an employee can sit down for lunch next to the boss is, 
according to him, an important feature of the open lunch areas. He states explicitly that he 
thinks this has a positive effect on the employee.   
 
Nicolas Jodal, the Director and founder of Artech which is located within Zonamerica 
supports the information from Hodara, also by highlighting nice lunches as the most 
important trust-building and team-building factor for his firm. However, the environment in 
Zonamerica which is highly influenced by international firms is not typical for most 
Uruguayan enterprises. Also it is a business and technology park, not an industrial park, 
which means that many of the employees have higher education. In the clothing factory Pelsa 
the reality is quite different. Situated in the quite poor industry zone, La Teja, the family-
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driven company has employees with other expectations and backgrounds.  Director Elbio 
Fuscaldo does not offer any spare-time activities for his employees.  
5.2.2 Trust in economic security  
Whether the mentioned activities had any pay-off in the promotion of productivity as the 
theory expects, was difficult to confirm. The interview subjects did not always understand 
what I had in mind when asking for the motivational pay-offs. Good colleagues play football 
together, and maybe go out for drink once in a while, but an institutionalized social 
environment at work did not seem familiar to all my respondents. For the ordinary Uruguayan 
worker, a substantial economic risk seemed to be the loss of a stable income. Trust as a risk-
moderator is thus important with respect to the employer’s ability to offer a safe working 
place, and not so important with respect to the theoretical expectations outlined, that trust in 
rewards for investing in working harder is necessary for increasing productivity. There are 
primary concerns that are more urgent in order to achieve trust to enhance productivity, than 
rewards or fellowship/ownership relations to his/her work. The primary concern is closely 
related to the overall economic situation of the country and the unemployment rate. In 
Uruguay the unemployment rate has been rather high the last 8 years due to the financial 
crisis in 2001/2002, although decreasing during the last few years, before the new financial 
crisis hit in 2008. In the Americas Barometer 2007 from LaPop, as much as 62 percent of 
Uruguayans state the economy as their main concern among 20 choices of concern grouped in 
categories as security, politics, basic services and others (Boidi and Queirolo 2008) 
26
. In 
second place comes security, with 15.5 percent.  
 
The perception of a somewhat low socioeconomic security in Uruguay is also underlined by 
data from International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). ICRG is an in-depth researched analysis 
based on elite opinions of the potential risks to international business operations. The system 
enables various types of risk to be measured and compared between countries. Incorporated 
economic risk factors are loan default, delayed payment of suppliers’ credits, political 
leadership, inflation and international liquidity ratios. The socioeconomic measure is an 
assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that might constrain 
government action or fuel social dissatisfaction ("International country risk guide"  2006). 
                                                 
26
 Latin American Public Opinion Project (LaPop) is an extensive study of democratic values in America. The 
Americas Barometer is one of their activities in this work. The 2008 round for Uruguay is included. 
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Unemployment, consumer confidence and poverty are the components here 
27
. On a twelve 
point scale where 12 is the best, Uruguay is rated with a five in 2006, which is the newest data 
freely available to the author. The mean for the latest ten years is 4.7. This shows that there is 
a considerable risk perception around the socioeconomic situation of Uruguay, which affects 
the labour market. And as mentioned, high risk perception indicated that trust is low. For 
comparison, Argentina scores 5.2, and also has the same mean value for the last ten years. 
The risk perception in the two countries is thus almost identical.  
 
The difficulty in obtaining a secure position in the labour market thus seems to be the biggest 
risk-perception given the socioeconomic conditions. Consequently, the initiatives needed 
from an employer in order to increase productivity as such centres around the feeling of 
security, rather than on material benefits. This does not reduce the importance of trust in the 
mechanism. On the contrary, it makes trust the core to a greater extent because it is not a 
bonus or other benefits that is necessary for the worker to increase the effort, it is trust in the 
employer.  
 
Fuscaldo in Pelsa supports the idea that trust in his capacity to offer secure employment is of 
great importance to the workers in order to keep up their production and stay on in the firm. 
He actually states that he prefers employees with lower education or few other possibilities of 
employment, because they tend to have lower expectations to return of their efforts (Fuscaldo 
2009). Thus, less is required in order to increase their production.  
 
“If I have to choose between an unemployed person and a person with a job, I stick to the 
unemployed. If I have to choose between a person with high or low skills, I try to hire the one 
with low skills so that he can have time to grow and develop within the firm. The person I 
surely would not choose is the one with a job and with perfect skills, since he will be quickly 
bored and quit” (Fuscaldo 2009).   
 
He believes that these two factors contribute to a higher trust relation between the employee 
and him. Or in other words, the employee to a greater extent is dependent on Fuscaldo and 
does not have much background for comparison. A crucial reason for Fuscaldo stating this, is 
the structure of Fuscaldo`s factory. He is the owner of a family business, similar in structure 
                                                 
27
 ICRD is an acknowledged database and according to the ICRG, its risk ratings have been cited by experts at 
the IMF, World Bank, United Nations, and other international institutions (Hoti 2004: 556) 
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to of many other Uruguayan businesses. There is thus a limit to how far an employee can 
reach in professional terms. He can never reach further than the son or daughter of the owner, 
independently of effort and contribution.  
 
“No one gets above the boss, and there is no one that can make themselves the son of the 
boss in order reach the top. The hierarchy is well established” (Fuscaldo 2009). 
 
Fuscaldo’s reasoning is that a very qualified employee will be bored since he has few 
opportunities of advancement in the business. A bored worker will furthermore produce less, 
and will probably sooner or later quit.  The worker no longer believes in some kind of reward. 
It is an employer’s task to retain the employee’s trust in that he/she will receive something 
back in order to increase effort. 
 
Fuscaldo’s thinking goes somewhat against the second theoretical expectations behind 
hypothesis 2 concerning trust and production: Zak and Knack stress that one function of trust 
in relation to labour is time that agents do not spend in verifying the labourers' actions. The 
boss does not need to supervise his workers, because he trusts that they do a good job (Zak 
and Knack 2001: 303). When Fuscaldo thus prefers an unskilled labour force which he has to 
train and supervise, he loses time which he could have spent on other activities. Although this 
only concerns one respondent in my data material, the aspect is somewhat omitted in the 
theoretical reasoning on trust’s role in receiving rewards: The reward does not necessarily 
need to be something material, it could be promotion within the business. As there is no 
possibility of this in Fuscaldo’s family business, he compensates by hiring employees with 
sufficiently low expectations.  
 
On the other hand, the family structures as such can contribute to an attitude that keeps down 
an environment of ambitions, which in the long run is negative for economic development of 
the firm. I will come back to this point when discussing Hypothesis 3, trust is good for 
investment.  
 
Some of the respondents seem afraid of giving a cynical impression when it comes to 
motivating the workers. Taking care of the employees is good, but admitting that this is a 
conscious strategy from the firm because happy and trusty employees produce more, is not 
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pronounced – or it is not conscious. On a follow-up question concerning programs to motivate 
employees at work, Gualberto Muñoz from the large tannery factory Zenda responded:  
 
“We do not think like that. For us, the life quality of the worker is most important, not 
their motivation to work or not” (Muñoz 2009).   
 
However, motivation and well-being are not contradictory factors as it seems from his answer, 
but rather closely connected. The whole mechanism rests on the latter leading to the former. 
Muñoz´ answer, and somewhat defensive attitude, highlights what Fernandez in the Chamber 
of Commerce and Service initially claimed that the human resource consciousness is not very 
developed in Uruguay.   
 
Social responsibility does not necessarily mean motivational programs or creating 
environments where the workers will thrive. Social responsibility can refer to the company’s 
fulfilment of the societal responsibility of society. Muñoz emphasizes Zendas contribution to 
the education of the employee’s children, Lombardi underlines the various contributions such 
as food tickets on birthdays, or pencil boxes for the children when school starts, which go to 
the families of his employees (Lombardi 2009; Muñoz 2009). This is in accordance with the 
point underlined by Hodara, the worker needs to feel that he contributes to an important firm, 
or a good firm or a big firm (Hodara 2009). The firm needs to have some positive 
characteristics. Thus, the environment within the workplace is not the only tool for motivation; 
the pride in the company is also motivational.   
5.2.3 Section summary  
For the ordinary Uruguayan worker, a substantial economic risk will be the loss of 
employment and consequently the loss of a stable income, or in the words of Bartesaghi 
(2009): “The Uruguayan is satisfied by little”. Trust as a risk-moderator is thus important with 
respect to the employer’s ability to offer a safe working place. All the respondents, except for 
two, mentioned non-work activities within their companies; although it did not seem like an 
institutionalised mentality among them. The directors working in the international free trade 
zone differed from the others by showing greater awareness of this topic. Whether trust in a 
safe employment contributes to increased productivity proved difficult to map out. However, 
the companies investigated in this thesis are all doing rather well economically, and as such, 
their strategy of offering something safe and predictable seems to have pay-offs. Accordingly, 
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the hypothesis has gained support. However, in order to produce a more robust analysis, this 
mechanism could have been further investigated by interviewing workers. Due to the time 
restrictions of this master thesis, this was not done. The theoretical mechanism is, as is the 
nature of theoretical explanations, strictly simplified, but it seems to function, though 
apparently different, in a developing country such as Uruguay. 
5.3 Trust promotes investment 
“Uruguay has a good environment for trade, but not for investment” (Bartesaghi 2009). 
 
Connected to the hypothesis of trust reducing transaction costs is the hypothesis that claims 
investments will increase with trust. The core of both is trust as a risk-reducing factor 
(Luhmann 2000). You are more likely to invest if you trust your investment partner. You are 
also more likely to find an investment partner if you trust your surroundings. Although 
Uruguay has the highest level of trust in Latin America, I find that the average Uruguayan 
does neither seem like a risk-managing person nor as an innovative one. The tendencies 
among the answers from the interview subjects show that their perception of Uruguayans is 
that they like to play safe. Hence, trust does not seem to function as a risk reducing factor for 
the Uruguayan to create new businesses and being innovative, or, trust does not have an effect. 
On the other hand, the respondents think Uruguay is considered as a safe and trustworthy 
partner for international investment, and thus an attractive trading partner for the international 
market.  
5.3.1 Attracting foreign investment  
I start with the latter point, Uruguay as safe and trustworthy for foreign investment first. 
According to Ignacio Bartesaghi, Uruguay has a well-functioning rule of law which people 
can rely on, and the country is also quite politically stable. Following the theoretical 
expectations, such functional institutions constitute a trust-promoting sanction mechanism and 
a source of trust (Rothstein and Stolle 2008), because people can believe that bad behaviour 
will be punished. In this respect, sanctions and trust are additives, since sanctions limit the 
risk involved in trust. Institutions are an example of risk-limiting sanctions at macro level, 
while networks, which function along the same logic, as they can constitute informal social 
sanction mechanisms, work on micro level (Humphrey 1998: 33). The core in both is, as 
mentioned, that trust in others is promoted by the environment around you because this 
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environment notice if you act untrusting, whether comprised of people (networks) or 
institutions (police etc) (Becker 1974).  
 
Fernandez, along with Bartesaghi, claims that there is an overall trust in the government 
institutions in the population of Uruguay (Fernandez 2009). Nonetheless, the view of trust in 
having your rights preserved by public institutions and legal framework can diverge between 
the employer and the employee. Fernandez draws an example:  
 
“On one hand, the renovation of the law concerning collective negotiation for labourers is 
seen as a step backwards from the point of view of a firm owner. It makes him loose 
control over the possibilities of regulating strikes, as a tool for bargaining salaries etc 
which should be his, according to the right of property. From the employee’s point of 
view, the law of collective negotiation increases the trust in institutions because the law 
secures him the right to influence the conditions of his work” (Fernandez 2009).  
 
In spite of such sources of variation, a consensus in the data material seems to exist, that trust 
in the government and legal institutions is common. This is supported by survey data from 
Latinobarómetro which shows that 52 % of the population in Uruguay has a lot of trust or 
some trust in the government and 56% has a lot or some trust in the judiciary on a four point 
scale (Latinobarómetro 2007). This is rather high compared to the neighbouring countries. In 
Argentina 23.6 % have some or a lot of confidence in the judiciary and 34.8 %in the 
government, while in Brazil the corresponding percentages are 41.6 % and 34.7 %
28
. Does 
this pay off as expected theoretically? Bartesaghi thinks this lays the ground for attracting 
international investors. He specifies that:  
 
“People in the international business where I work trust each other” (Bartesaghi 2009).  
 
Lombardi points at the Uruguayan businessmen as “serious” within the Latin American 
context, and Rial from Conaprole compares Uruguay with the neighbouring countries: 
 
                                                 
28
 In the survey the data are based on subjective understandings of words and concepts. The word confidence can 
easily be mixed with agreement, impression, evaluation etc. It is therefore difficult to reveal the difference 
between those perceptions among the respondents in an accurate way. However, it still reflects the opinion of the 
people concerning private firms.  
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“The Uruguayan is a quite serious person in comparative terms, along with the Chilean. 
The Argentinean is not […]. The fact that Uruguay is so small makes people be careful in 
their way of doing business” (Lombardi 2009). 
 
“Uruguay has a good reputation of trusting and honest people in general” (Rial 2009).   
 
The size, as mentioned earlier, causes transparency which creates an honest culture, according 
to Lombardi. The mechanisms of control and punishment as such function and contribute to 
an environment of trust. Hodara agrees:  
 
“Uruguay has the name of a serious trading partner; reliable, responsible, delivering 
quality products. Uruguay was the biggest export country of Mercosur just a few years 
ago. Why is this? Because the market is so small, the competition so hard, that you need 
to take good care of the customers you get in order not to lose them” (Hodara 2009).  
 
It should be mentioned, as Ostrom highlights, that the attractiveness of Uruguay for foreign 
investors is probably due to many elements (Ostrom 2000), e.g. educated citizens as 
highlighted by the human capital measure in the quantitative analysis. Next to Brazil, 
Uruguay has the highest mean level of human capital among the 19 countries in the sample 
between 1996 and 2007. The education level in Uruguay contributes to the quality of the 
labour force, which is important for the international market. Compared to the level of 
education in the region, Uruguay has a highly skilled labour force. Illiteracy is almost non-
existent, and the public, free primary education is at a quite elevated level. Data from LaPop 
2008 shows that only 1.3 percent of the population have no education. As much as 48 percent 
of the sample had secondary education, and 16.6 had superior level education (Boidi and 
Queirolo 2008). Furthermore, the Universidad de la República, which is the public university, 
is free and well recognized (Hodara 2009)
29
.  
 
However, how the Uruguayans are viewed by the international market should intuitively not 
be determined by the level of trust inside Uruguay. Rather, it rests on the trust of the actors. If 
Brazilians trust Uruguayans and invest in Uruguayan products, it is the level of trust in Brazil 
that determines the Brazilians behaviour. Nonetheless, as trust and trustworthiness are highly 
                                                 
29
 High levels of social capital followed by high levels of human capital are not very surprising since they 
according to the theory are expected to correlate (Coleman 1988).  
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correlated (Glaeser 1999; Knack 2001), there is a relationship between how the Uruguayans 
are judged by the outside world and the level of trust inside Uruguay. The level of trust can 
thus contribute to economic gains in this respect: It contributes to Uruguay’s good reputation 
as being reliable.  
 
This reputation is supported by risk- indicators from the International Country Risk Guide. 
Uruguay scores 9.5 on investment profile in 2006, which is an assessment of factors affecting 
risk to invest within the political component ("International country risk guide"  2006). The 
subcomponents of investment profile are contract viability, profit repatriation and payment 
delays. 70-80 percent of the total ranking should be defined as low risk according to ICRG. 
Uruguay is at 79 percent, and has thus a low risk investment profile, in agreement with the 
opinion of the interviewed business leaders.  
5.3.2 Repelling internal investment  
The quantitative analysis shows that investment has a positive significant effect on growth in 
Latin America. However, in Uruguay, the investment share of the GDP is one of the lowest on 
the continent. Is this reflected in the interview data?  
 
As my sample of interview subjects largely consisted of representatives from big and well-
known firms, the focus is biased towards these actors. However, I got information concerning 
how the respondents perceived the internal investment market and this perception indeed 
reflects the findings in the quantitative analysis. The overall answers do not directly support 
the impression of an environment of trust in Uruguay, or trust does not have the theoretically 
expected effect on investment.   
 
“The concept businessman is not a very valued one here in Uruguay” (Muñoz 2009).  
 
Muñoz states that there are few real “emprededores” or enterprising people in Uruguay, which 
he thinks contributes to the low image of a businessman. He stated that if there had been a 
survey investigating this topic, “businessman” would have been evaluated as a negative word. 
He does not have any figures to support his claim when stating this, just his own impression. I 
have used Latinobarómetro data from 2007 to investigate if there is support for his perception. 
The data in table 5.1 show that 11.3 percent of the Uruguayan population have no confidence 
in private enterprises, while 36.4 have a little on a 4 point scale. Only 6.1 percent have a lot of 
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confidence. When the respondents were asked to evaluate the businessmen of their country on 
a four point scale, the results were a bit more positive. Just 6.6 percent evaluate them as “very 
bad”, while 21.8 answered they are “bad”. Almost 50 percent answers “good”. In comparison 
with the Argentinean population, the picture of businessmen in Uruguay is not so negative 
after all. In Argentina 15.3 percent evaluate businessmen as “very bad” and 33.1 as “bad”. 
Nevertheless, the numbers give some support to Muñoz’ statement. Over 20 percent of the 
population thinks businessmen are “bad”. I assume that the “businessmen” within this 
category do not only conduct business with each other, hence this perception influences the 
trust of the whole investment culture. 
 
Table 5.1 Evaluation of Businessmen 
  Uruguay     Argentina 
   Frequency Percent           Cumulative            Frequency         Percent        Cumulative   
               percent            percent 
Very good 38         3.2    5.7  9      .8    4.3 
Good  570      7.5  53.5  395  32.9  37.2 
Bad  262         21.8  75  397  33.1  70.3 
Very bad 79               6.6  81.6  183  15.3  85.5 
                    Source: Latinobarómetro 2007 
Table 5.1 shows businessmen from Uruguay and Argentina evaluated by the population in 
theses two countries.  
 
Bartesaghi is also worried about the culture of innovation and business.  
 
“There is not an appropriate environment for creating business-people in Uruguay. The 
Uruguayan is culturally conservative, not taking risks or playing anything. This fact is of 
major concern for the Chamber” (Bartesaghi 2009).  
 
Bartesaghi actually repeats this points several times during the interview. He believes this 
culture of some kind of tall puppy syndrome
30
 influences the internal business climate 
extensively. The negative association of the success of others in economic terms contributes 
to the lack of ambition and willingness to take risks among Uruguayans. According to 
Bartesaghi it is viewed as positive to be satisfied with little (Bartesaghi 2009): “The 
Uruguayan is pleased with little…which causes an unhealthy environment for innovation” 
(Bartesaghi 2009). 
                                                 
30
 Tall poppy syndrome, or the Law of Jante,  is a perceived tendency to discredit those who achieve notable 
wealth or prominence (The oxford dictionary of phrase and fable  2006). 
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Lombardi also points to the fact that the Uruguayan likes to play safe. This is somewhat 
unexpected given the functional institutions highlighted by the respondents. Theoretically, 
high levels of trust, along with functioning institutions, are risk-reducing which then in turn 
should give incentives for investment (Bjørnskov 2003: 6). Lombardi states that the lack of 
risk results in a “grey” investment environment where people tend to repeat the same 
procedures, and not doing something new (Lombardi 2009). Jodal sees a paradox in the view 
of entrepreneurs and business people in Uruguay:  
 
“I think this is quite interesting because in the media the businessman is associated with 
problems, corruption and none-concrete things. For example for a few weeks ago there was 
a bank crisis and some of the most important bank directors where arrested. On one hand 
these scandals tarnish the reputation of the business people. But on the other hand, I think 
that if you ask people what they want their children to be, the majority would have liked 
them to become  a business person” (Jodal 2009).  
 
The overall impression of the mainstream Uruguayan presented by my interviewees is a 
conservative and security-focused actor. Trust as a risk-moderator does not seem to function 
very well. According to the first-hand data, the mechanisms behind hypothesis 3 trust 
increases investment thus seem divergent. First, trust does play a role in the relation of 
Uruguayans with the international market. Uruguay has a trustworthy image abroad according 
to the respondents. This might, as highlighted by some of the respondents themselves, also be 
explained by how Uruguay is viewed comparatively. It appears as a serious and trustworthy 
country compared to its neighbours Argentina and Brazil. Secondly, networks and relations 
within Uruguay are highly present, promoting a trusting environment which functions in a 
positive way for investment. But thirdly, and contrary to the two first points, the Uruguayans 
do not seem to carry a general trust or confidence, as few people take risks and innovate in 
business. This is somewhat in accordance with the results from the quantitative data. 
Although Uruguay was the most trusting country among the Latin American counties, 72.7 
percent of the population did NOT trust in others.  
5.3.3 Section summary 
Trust as a risk-moderator is not tracked within Uruguay. In my sample of respondents there 
exists a perception of Uruguayans as poor risk-managers. This is in accordance with the low 
macro results of Uruguay on investment measures presented in the quantitative analysis. 
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Although Uruguayans are viewed as trust-worthy and honest trading-partners by the 
international environment, hypothesis 3 trust promotes investment is not supported. Whether 
this is due to an insufficient stock of social capital in Uruguay, or because the mechanism 
does not function according with the theory, is difficult to say. Further analysis is necessary 
for modifying the theory.  
5.4 Concluding the qualitative analysis 
The goal of this analysis chapter was to use primary interview data from Uruguay to 
investigate three hypotheses. Those are: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Trust lowers transaction costs 
Hypothesis 2: Trust has a positive effect on productivity. 
Hypothesis 3: Trust promotes investment 
 
The analysis finds support for hypothesis 1. Networks which create trust are frequent in 
Uruguay, and there is an environment where most business people know each other, which in 
turn facilitates transactions: First by making it easy to find people with whom to transact, 
secondly by lowering the documentation needed in order to trust the partner. Small 
environments create a transparency which promotes trust by constituting a sanctioning 
mechanism people can rely on. Trust also seems to make an informal economy possible, since 
buying products or services informally requires a trust in the other part. Ultimately, trust also 
seems to make up for too low transaction costs – corruption. The subjectively perceived 
corruption level is comparatively low among the respondents.  
 
The results from the analysis on hypothesis 2 are somewhat more divergent. The 
consciousness of enhancing production through the motivation of workers does not seem to be 
well developed in Uruguay: “Human resource policy in the companies, or even something 
corresponding, is non-existent” (Bartesaghi 2009). However, is seems that it is not necessarily 
needed. Workers in a developing country have other expectations of their bosses, and can be 
satisfied by the insurance of a secure employment. Trust in a stable and safe income thus 
constitutes the core risk-moderator and incentive to work hard. However, in order to achieve 
more robust results one should ask workers concerning the increase in their productivity.  
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The data material throwing light on Hypothesis 3 is also mixed. Based on the interviews, 
Uruguayans neither seem to be risk-taking nor innovative. However, indictors from the ICRG 
coincide with the perception of the respondents in Uruguay that the country is evaluated as 
attractive from a foreign investment point of view. Due to their functioning institutions, 
judicial security and democratic stability, sanction mechanisms exist for punishing bad 
business behaviour. The networks within the business sector have the same function as risk-
moderators. Nonetheless, among the average Uruguayan trust does not seem to be risk-
reducing and promote investment, hence, hypothesis 3 is not supported.   
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6 CONCLUSIONS  
 
6.1 How and why to track trust 
The aim of this thesis was to investigate how social capital influences economic development 
in Latin America.   
 
In order to answer the research question it was first of all necessary to elaborate on what 
social capital is. I identified trust as a core element in all of the theoretical definitions 
reviewed in this thesis. I furthermore pointed out theoretical explanations of why trust 
influences the economy. This formed the basis for the three hypotheses about the mechanisms 
that link the two. These are H1: Trust lowers transaction costs, H2: Trust increases production 
and H3: Trust increases investment. In the methods chapter I argued that determining a 
general relationship between trust and growth in the Latin American continent is a necessary 
foundation for investigating these hypotheses. Proper tools for determining the general 
relationship, selecting a case, and for tracing the causal mechanisms between trust and 
economic output were also presented in the methodology chapter.  
 
The regression analysis supported the main hypothesis; trust promotes economic development. 
It also revealed that Uruguay was a case particularly appropriate for investigating the theory 
because it had the highest value on the variable of interest, namely social capital. Although 
Uruguay did not seem like a perfect case according to Liebermann (2005) due to the non-
correspondingly low economic growth, it has proved a useful case. I was able to answer the 
research question based on the interview data from Uruguayan business-people, and the 
comparatively low economic growth seemed to be explained mainly by influential control 
variables; low levels of investment share of GDP and population growth.  
6.2 Has trust been tracked?  
The answer to the research question is that social capital explains economic development in 
Latin America through lowering of transaction costs and through increasing productivity, 
though in a slightly different way than theoretically expected. Trust does not seem to explain 
economic development through investment in the case of Uruguay.  
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Table 6.1 Results 
Expectation                 Supported 
Hypothesis 1: Trust lowers transaction costs    Yes 
Hypothesis 2: Trust has a positive effect on productivity   Yes 
Hypothesis 3: Trust promotes investment        No 
 
The qualitative analysis on Uruguay supports hypothesis 1. Trust seems to potentially reduce 
the costs related to contract making, both in the sense of finding contract partners easily and 
using little time to secure the transactions. Furthermore, the small size of Uruguay contributes 
to promotion of trust in transactions. It also appears that trust plays a part in enabling informal 
economic activity, such as markets, in Uruguay. 
 
The results for hypothesis 2 are supported, but demonstrate that trust seems to play a different 
role than expected theoretically. The substantial economic risk for an average Uruguayan 
worker will be the loss of employment and consequently the loss of a stable income. 
Motivation for increasing productivity does hence not seem to rest on trust in receiving higher 
wages or a material reward, but rather in maintaining a safe employment. Confidence between 
the employer and the employee is thus necessary for the worker to enhance the productivity. 
As Uruguay has relatively low socioeconomic security, the primary concern of Uruguayans is 
to preserve a monthly income.  
 
The evidence for analysis on hypothesis 3 are not uniform, and shed light on a difference 
between how Uruguayans invest, and how they are seen as investment partners from abroad. 
On the one hand, my interviewees think that Uruguay is perceived as a safe, trustworthy and a 
good country to invest in by foreigners. On the other hand, the argument about the role of 
trust in investment is not supported; the respondents stress a low investment environment and 
a high risk-perception among ordinary Uruguayans, which is supported by other data sources. 
As such, trust does not seem to function as risk-reducing as the theory expects, and hypothesis 
3 is not supported.  
 
 The overall conclusion is that the theoretical transmission mechanisms in Uruguay to some 
extent function according to the expectations, but need to be adapted to the context of a 
developing country. Societal factors such as level of development, education and crime 
influence the way trust affects the economy. In addition, the analysis revealed the small size 
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of Uruguay as an important intervening variable on the sources of social capital. This is 
illustrated by figure 6.1. 
 
Figure 6.1 The argument revised  
 
 
INTERVENING VARIABLES       ARGUMENT            
              ECONOMIC     
        DEVELOPMENT        
 
Socioeconomic                          +       +       -                 
conditions                                                                                                                                                                                                         
Security          
Size                +      + -     + -  
 
                          TRUST 
6.3 Implications for future tracks 
The main theoretical purpose of this thesis has been to confront the criticism of social capital 
theory as lacking elaboration on the transfer mechanisms to economic development. 
Woolcock and Narayan (2000: 243) explicitly called for “ … more work on unbundling the 
mechanisms through which social capital works”. 
 
This thesis has contributed to the understanding of those mechanisms through the use of 
unique data material gathered in Uruguay. The results highlight the aptness of an in-depth 
analysis of this research question because interviews with micro level actors in growth-
promoting positions in Uruguay worked well for mapping micro level mechanisms. 
Furthermore, the fieldwork contributed to broaden my contextual understanding of Uruguay. 
The respondents gave a lot of information, some of it not directly useful in the analysis, but 
rather as an informative backdrop. Speaking the mother tongue of the respondents was a big 
advantage both during the interviews and in order to arrange them.  
 
However, I have interviewed a quite homogenous group of Uruguayan business leaders. It is 
difficult to know whether other respondents would have given other answers and 
        H1     H2     H3 
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consequently given other results in the analysis. Nevertheless, by using secondary sources in 
the analysis, I have strengthened and/or challenged the results.  
 
Still, it would have been relevant to interview a larger heterogeneous group of respondents. 
Since tendencies reveal that the dynamics between trust and the economy is influenced by 
such factors as the size of the businesses and since the small family-driven businesses in 
Uruguay are numerous, an interesting next step would be to interview several representatives 
from such small firms as well. For investigating Hypothesis 2, trust increases productivity, an 
interesting sample of respondents would have been workers from different types of labour.  
 
In this thesis, a country with different conditions of living than what the original cases which 
the theory was induced from has been investigated. As the conclusion has shown, some of the 
mechanisms seem valid in Uruguay. However, the analysis indicates that other variables are 
important in the relation between trust and economic output in Uruguay. An amplification of 
the scope of analysis would therefore be useful, taking these factors into consideration to a 
higher degree. As such, the social capital theory would adapt better in a developing context. 
Although this single case-study cannot modify a theory, numerous future analyses might.  
 
Lastly, both institutions and networks have proved important in creating trust according to my 
interview data. A more thorough analysis on where social capital stems from would therefore 
be fruitful in order to understand the investigated causality better. Since the creation of trust 
has proved to be of a multilevel character, a multilevel analysis which is able to include 
variables on different levels would be appropriate for such an investigation (Luke 2004). A 
three-level structure analysis of the influence of networks/organizations (meso) and 
institutions (macro) on trust (micro), would contribute to a further understanding of the trust 
concept.  
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APPENDIX 1  
 
Interview guide 
 
Preguntas particulares sobre la empresa 
 
1. ¿Cuál es su rol dentro de la empresa? 
2. ¿Al hacer negocios, siempre utiliza contratos escritos?  
 - ¿También en casos de acuerdos de poca importancia? 
3. ¿En general, ya conoce las personas con quien hace contratos? 
 - ¿Diría que ya conoce a las personas facilita el hacer contratos? 
4. ¿Diría Usted que falta de confianza en las posibles partes de negocios es un problema 
frecuente?  
5. ¿Cómo difunde información dentro de tu empresa? 
6. ¿Utiliza una red o algún Network para difundir información/ propaganda sobre su empresa? 
7. ¿Se encuentra con compañeros de trabajo en su tiempo libre/ fura del trabajo? 
 
8. ¿Existen actividades organizadas por la empresa de carácter no laboral? 
- Por ejemplo futbol, coros, cenas etc. 
9. ¿Opina que estas actividades tienen algún efecto en el ambiente laboral y también a la 
productividad de la empresa? 
10. ¿Tiene la impresión de que la taza de rotación es alta o baja? 
- ¿Como afecta el ambiente laboral? ¿Afecta la productividad? 
11. ¿Qué tal el ambiente de inversión en Uruguay? 
- ¿Se puede decir que ambiente de inversión en Uruguay es caracterizado por gente 
honesta y confiable? 
 - Porqué? 
12. ¿Hay programas para motivar sus empleados dentro de la empresa?  
- Por ejemplo  “premios”, bonos, o eventos sociales 
- ¿Cómo afecta eso a la productividad? 
13. ¿Cual es la estrategia de desarrollo de la empresa? 
14. ¿Cómo mantiene las buenas relaciones de confianza y productividad en la empresa en 
tiempo de crisis? 
15. ¿Su empresa forma parte de algún sindicato? 
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Preguntas de carácter general 
16. ¿Como describiría Usted la cultura/el ambiente empresarial de Uruguay?  
- ¿Formal o informal? 
- Hay varias formas de informalidad, me refiero a informalidad social y económica. 
17. ¿Diría Usted que es una buena cultura/buen ambiente para crear nuevas empresas en 
Uruguay? 
18. ¿Existen incentivos de parte del estado para crear nuevos negocios/empresas? 
- ¿Cuáles son? 
19. ¿Conoce rutinas para contralar la corrupción en Uruguay?  
20. ¿Siente seguridad jurídica en Uruguay? 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
Countries in the quantitative analysis  
 
1  Argentina         11 PuertoRico        
  2 Brazil            12 Uruguay           
3 Chile             13 Bolivia           
4 Colombia          14 Guatemala         
5 Costa Rica        15 Honduras          
6 DominicanRepublic 16 Nicaragua         
7 Ecuador           17 Panama            
8 El Salvador       18 Paraguay          
9 Mexico            19 Venezuela         
10 Peru                        
 
 
 
 
Normal distribution of the dependent variable, growth in GDP 
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Correlations 
       
    
Population 
growth GDPLevelPPP 
Investment 
share 
Human 
capital Growth 
Social trust Pearson Correlation -0.168 0.112 0.130 -0.145 0.328 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.491 0.657 0.596 0.566 0.170 
  N 19 18 19 18 19 
Population 
growth Pearson Correlation   -0.515 0.209 -0.688 0.107 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   0.029 0.391 0.002 0.662 
  N   18 19 18 19 
GDPLevelPPP Pearson Correlation     -0.172 0.539 0.076 
  Sig. (2-tailed)     0.494 0.021 0.765 
  N     18 18 18 
Investment 
share Pearson Correlation       -0.422 0.643 
  Sig. (2-tailed)       0.081 0.003 
  N       18 19 
Human capital Pearson Correlation         -0.106 
  Sig. (2-tailed)         0.676 
  N         18 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).   
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).   
 
 
 
 
